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“For unto whom much is given, of him shall much be required; and to 
whom men have committed much, of him they will ask more.” 
Luke 12:481 
 
“[G]reat power involves great responsibility.” 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt2 
 
John Thompson’s death sentence was overturned.  The prosecutor had 
withheld forensic evidence proving Thompson’s innocence.  Thompson served 
eighteen years in prison.3 
Three Duke lacrosse players were charged with rape.  The prosecutor was 
aware that the “victim” had lied.  The Attorney General dropped all of the 
charges a year later.4 
Mark Sodersten’s murder conviction was overturned.  The prosecutor had 
withheld exonerative audiotapes.  Sodersten served twenty-two years and died 
in prison six months before his conviction was reversed.5 
William Ruehle was indicted for backdating stock options.  The prosecutor 
intimidated the defense’s witnesses to prevent them from testifying.  A federal 
judge ultimately dismissed the charges, citing “shameful” conduct by 
prosecutor.6 
Michael Morton served twenty-five years in prison for murder.  The 
prosecutor failed to turn over exculpatory evidence.  Morton was later 
exonerated by DNA evidence.7 
Senator Ted Stevens was convicted of fraud weeks before commencing his 
sixth re-election campaign for the U.S. Senate.  The prosecutor failed to disclose 
 1. Some say that an appeal to religious authority constitutes harmful error.  See, e.g., 
Sandoval v. Calderon, 231 F.3d 1140, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]ny suggestion that the jury 
may base its decision on a ‘higher law’ than that of the court in which it sits is forbidden.”); see 
also KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 
1997-2002, at 22, 30–31 (2010). 
 2. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Undelivered Address Prepared for Jefferson Day (April 13, 1945), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16602. 
 3. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011). 
 4. Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A 
Fundamental Failure to “Do Justice”, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1337–38 (2007). 
 5. In re Sodersten, 53 Cal. Rptr. 572, 576, 610–11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see also RIDOLFI  
& POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 4. 
 6. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 601–02, 613 (9th Cir. 2009); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, 
supra note 1, at 18; see also Stuart Pfeifer & E. Scott Reckard, Broadcom Fraud Charges 
Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A1, A16. 
 7. Morton v. State of Texas, 761 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988); see also Ex parte 
Morton, No. AP-76663, 2011 WL 4827841, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 12, 2011) (per curiam). 
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exculpatory evidence.  Two and a half years later, the verdict was set aside and 
the indictment was dismissed.8 
Two truths: (1) prosecutors have awesome powers, and (2) “crime is 
contagious.”9  In a civil society, a prosecutor’s deliberate decision to misuse his 
power usurps foundational trust in the judicial system.  The American criminal 
justice system is at its fairest when both sides adhere to the rules.10  It is at its 
worst “when any accused is treated unfairly.”11  Although society agrees on 
these general principles, it cannot seem to agree on what to do with those who 
abuse the system.12 
To be clear, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are relatively rare. 13  
However, when prosecutors abuse their power—causing harm to individuals 
fighting for their liberty—they too often go unpunished and are therefore 
encouraged to repeat the unethical conduct.14  Although the injustice is greater 
when it harms the innocent,15 prosecutorial misconduct is still unjust when it 
harms the guilty, who, regardless of their crimes, are entitled to the full 
protection of the Constitution.16 
 8. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-231(EGS), 2009 WL 6525926, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 
2009); see Paul Kane, Sen. Ted Stevens Loses Reelection Bid, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2008, at  
A1–A2 (describing the trial’s impact on Senator Stevens’s campaign). 
 9. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“A prosecutor has a duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction. . . .  [W]hile he may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for the 
law . . . it invites anarchy.”).  Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 
2005 BYU L. REV. 53, 124 (2005) (“Prosecutors who engage in misconduct strike not just hard 
blows, but criminal blows.”). 
 10. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“Society wins not only when the guilty are 
convicted but when criminal trials are fair. . . .”). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959, 964–65 (2009) (discussing disagreement over regulating the conduct of 
prosecutors). 
 13. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: 
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987); see also Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors and 
Corrupt Science, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 448 (2007) (noting that there is little information about 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 14. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 409–16 (2001).  See generally Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the 
Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1083 (1994) (observing that punishment for prosecutorial misconduct is relatively 
uncommon). 
 15. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 64–66 (“It is impossible to overestimate the 
magnitude of the wrong done to an innocent person wrongfully convicted of a crime.  The 
psychological, emotional and economic harm can be equivalent to the destruction of a life.”). 
 16. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 4 (“Prosecutorial misconduct is an important 
issue for us as a society, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the criminal defendants involved in 
the individual cases.”); Davis, supra note 14, at 408–13, 422–37 (explaining that prosecutorial 
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It seems irresponsible for a civil society, founded upon bedrock principles of 
integrity and honor, to tolerate unscrupulous actors with such far-reaching 
power.17  These prosecutors cannot be voted out of office (though their bosses 
can be), and they are rarely punished for their misdeeds through the traditional 
channels, such as by judicial condemnation, bar association sanctions, or 
criminal prosecution. 18   Consequently, those channels are not an adequate 
deterrent.19  While errant prosecutors who are caught abusing their office may 
feel the sting of a wrist-slap just long enough to reach for their local government 
policy handbook, they are likely to forget which aspect of their ethical 
obligations they intended to refresh in their mind by the time they have located 
the table of contents.  Such is the unfortunate consequence of the ineffective 
sanctions levied against misbehaving prosecutors. 
Because prosecutors are not subject to civil liability for misconduct,20 they 
must be subject to some sort of meaningful disciplinary action.  Academics and 
practitioners considering the problem of punishing prosecutorial misconduct 
agree that the disciplinary measures in place are grossly inadequate.21  Most 
misconduct, such as overcharging, abuse of the grand jury process, and the introduction of improper 
evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional rights). 
 17. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 4 (“Prosecutorial misconduct fundamentally 
perverts the course of justice and costs taxpayers millions of dollars in protracted litigation.  It 
undermines our trust in the reliability of the justice system and subverts the notion that we are a 
fair society.”). 
 18. Bibas, supra note 12, at 983–89 (noting that only “head prosecutors” are subject to 
political checks and can be voted out of office). 
 19. See David Keenan, Deborah J. Cooper, David Lebowitz & Tamar Lerer, The Myth of 
Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional 
Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
203, 208–09 (2011) (highlighting Justice Thomas’s language in Connick v. Thompson, which 
explained that a prosecutor’s broad ability to make legal judgments is not indicative of 
constitutional danger); see also Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many 
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 92 (2005) (emphasizing 
that it is an unusual case in which a court explicitly concludes that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct and refers the case for punishment). 
 20. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). 
 21. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 14, at 457–61 & n.364 (discussing the need for a misconduct 
review board, which was originally proposed in the Citizen Protection Act of 1998); Bennett L. 
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 453–55 (1992) (suggesting national 
judicial commissions as a method by which to address prosecutorial misconduct); Natasha Minsker, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death Penalty Cases, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 373, 398–403 (2009) 
(lamenting the lack of effective remedies to combat prosecutorial misconduct); Lorraine Morey, 
Keeping the Dragon Slayers in Check: Reining in Prosecutorial Misconduct, 5 PHOENIX L. REV. 
617, 619 (2011) (recognizing the need for an independent prosecutorial commission to regulate and 
discipline prosecutorial behavior and to disclose, in each case, the offending prosecutor’s name, the 
outcome of any investigation, and any discipline that was imposed); Morton, supra note 14, at 1114 
(“[D]isciplinary systems currently in place to remedy and deter prosecutorial misconduct are 
inadequate to handle the amount and nature of the ethical violations courts regularly witness.”); 
Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 982–83  
(1984) (proposing that every state adopt legislation similar to a Texas statute that created a 
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recognize that, although misconduct should not be tolerated, the lack of 
accountability results in implicit acceptance of wrongdoing.22  To deter further 
misconduct and abuse of power, prosecutors must be punished more severely 
than attorneys who hold less distinguished and privileged positions. 23   For 
example, prosecutors guilty of misconduct could be punished as willful 
perjurers, which can carry a heavy penalty.24 
Although this approach may seem too draconian, meaningful and actionable 
reform is long overdue.  More must be done to protect citizens from the 
unintended and far-reaching consequences of a prosecutor’s deliberate decision 
to flout the Constitution and her ethical obligations.  Accordingly, this Article 
proposes establishing independent commissions charged with investigating 
prosecutorial misconduct at all levels and equipped with the power to sanction, 
suspend, or disbar prosecutors who abuse their positions. 
This Article begins by setting forth the proper role of prosecutors.  The Article 
then examines the prevalence and consequences of prosecutorial misconduct and 
identifies the primary types of prosecutorial misconduct.  Part IV surveys the 
disciplinary efforts of several jurisdictions, and Part V dissects the inadequacies 
of current practices in coping with the problem.  Next, the Article critiques the 
proposals set forth by others to address prosecutorial abuse.  Part VII analyzes 
the methodology and effectiveness of independent judicial commissions as a 
model for commissions regarding prosecutors.  Finally, the Article proposes 
establishing independent commissions to effectively investigate and sanction 
prosecutors guilty of misconduct. 
mechanism for policing and imposing sanctions on prosecutors for their misconduct); Ellen 
Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously,  
8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 276, 297–98 (2004) (noting that the current “slap on the wrist” 
disciplinary scheme fails to deter misconduct); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of 
Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 776 (2001) (acknowledging the proposals of other commentators 
to establish an independent body to address prosecutorial misconduct and suggesting that, while 
such a measure may be “overenthusiastic[],” it is nevertheless necessary). 
 22. Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 277 (“While all courts, prosecutors, and defenders would 
certainly agree that it is ‘highly reprehensible’ to suppress facts or secrete evidence ‘capable of 
establishing the innocence of the accused,’ when it happens, the disciplinary consequence is often 
nil . . . .  [T]here appears to be an implicit agreement that, absent rare circumstances, offending 
prosecutors should not be subject to sanctions before disciplinary committees.”); see also Bibas, 
supra note 12, at 965–68 (noting that state legislatures have an incentive to give broad powers to 
prosecutors in order to reduce crime); Green, supra note 19, at 69–70 (explaining that many 
prosecutors fail to fulfill their ethical duties and that current enforcement mechanisms are 
inadequate to remedy the problem). 
 23. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 75. 
 24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 128 (West 1999) (“Every person who, by willful perjury 
or subornation of perjury procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person, is 
punishable by death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole.”). 
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I.  THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
“Anyone entrusted with power will abuse it if not also animated with 
the love of truth and virtue, no matter whether he be a prince, or one 
of the people.” 
Jean de La Fontaine 
Prosecutors are at the heart of the criminal justice system.25  They initiate the 
process,26 prioritize the process,27 and, to a great extent, determine the outcome 
of the process. 28   For the American criminal justice system to function as 
intended, prosecutors must temper their power by fulfilling the ethical and 
professional duties owed to the defendants they prosecute.29 
While a prosecutor has an obligation to prosecute vigorously, she has a 
corresponding duty to ensure a just result and to avoid wrongfully convicting 
innocent defendants. 30   Indeed, “the prosecutor is not only the defendant’s 
adversary, but is also the ‘. . . guardian of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.’”31  She may not “act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes 
the protection afforded by the right to counsel.” 32  Unfortunately, idealistic 
words espousing the merits of an adversarial system can easily be lost in the 
rough-and-tumble of the competitive, and often mean-spirited, world of criminal 
trials.33  Frequently, lofty notions of the prosecutor prince holding himself above 
 25. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934); Morton, supra note 14, at 1086 
(“[Prosecutors] occupy a unique position in our adversarial system.”). 
 26. See Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L 223, 224–25 
(2006). 
 27. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
997 (2006) (observing that prosecutors “make key decisions in criminal matters”). 
 28. See Langer, supra note 26, at 224–25 (arguing that prosecutors control the outcome of 
criminal matters because they control charging, guilty pleas, and sentencing).  The Supreme Court 
has curtailed some of the power of state and federal prosecutors to control sentencing through the 
use of sentencing guidelines.  See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–46 (2005) (holding 
that federal sentencing guidelines are not mandatory, but rather advisory, unless the defendant 
admits facts necessary to enhance a sentence or the government proves them beyond a reasonable 
doubt at trial); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (invalidating state sentencing 
guidelines that permitted prosecutors to enhance punishments without proving to a jury the acts 
essential to the punishment); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (holding that any 
increase in the penalty for a crime must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial). 
 29. See Morton, supra note 14, at 1086–87. 
 30. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (“It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.”). 
 31. People v. Sherrick, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting People v. 
Trevino, 704 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1985) (en banc)). 
 32. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 171 (overturning a conviction based on a coerced confession); Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 415–16 (1976) (detailing the false and misleading testimony introduced 
and the exculpatory evidence suppressed by the prosecution); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
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the fray give way to the grisly reality of trials that discredit and demean all 
participants, including the prosecutor.34 
Abstract notions of the prosecutor’s role presented in judicial opinions lack 
the specificity needed to properly guide the conduct of prosecutors.35  Similarly 
vague is the general admonition in the American Bar Association Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct (MRPC), which places an affirmative duty on all 
lawyers to report misconduct of other lawyers.36 
As a response to the dearth of guidance, the MRPC set forth generalized 
guidelines that apply to all lawyers, 37 as well as heightened responsibilities 
specific to prosecutors.38  The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice also impose heightened standards on prosecutors, including a specific 
duty to protect the rights of the defendant.39  Beyond these non-specific notions 
of how prosecutors must conduct themselves in the real world of the criminal 
justice system, there are few concrete rules of conduct and even fewer specific 
consequences that may ensue for errant behavior. 
201, 205–06 (1964) (illustrating the prosecutor’s use of incriminating statements he knew would 
violate the Constitution). 
 34. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (explaining that the prosecutor’s role is to see that justice is 
done). 
 35. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1362–63 (citing rules governing 
prosecutors’ behavior without explaining their practical use). 
 36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2013) (“A lawyer who knows that another 
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate professional authority.”).  The comment accompanying Rule 8.3 further 
clarifies that “[t]he term ‘substantial’ refers to the seriousness of the possible offense.”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 2 (2013); see also Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The 
Role of Law Schools in Addressing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391,  
432–33, 431 n.156 (2011) (discussing the model rules). 
 37. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and 
the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 223–24 & n.2 (1993) (noting 
that the Model Rules define “the posture lawyers should take in a variety of situations”). 
 38. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981) (“The responsibility of a 
public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to 
convict.”); see also Washington v. Hofbaur, 228 F.3d 689, 709 (6th Cir. 2000) (cautioning that “a 
prosecutor must be doubly careful to stay within the bounds of proper conduct”). 
 39. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 90 & n.97 (citing the applicable ABA 
standards). 
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II.  PREVALENCE OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Given the number of prosecutions in this country, wrongful convictions are 
inevitable.  Mistaken identification,40 forensic errors,41 lying witnesses,42 and 
perjuring police officers43 all contribute to errors in the system.  Those errors, 
although regrettable, are not the prosecutor’s.  Rather, when prosecutors err, the 
system itself becomes suspect.  In recent years, prosecutors have been 
responsible for a number of astonishing instances of wrongful conviction.44  
Wrongful convictions hinder valuable societal interests,45 diminish the integrity 
of the legal system, and foster a lack of faith in American justice.46  Moreover, 
lest we lose sight of the obvious, a wrongful conviction results in fundamental 
injustice to a defendant by jeopardizing his livelihood, reputation, finances, and 
 40. The majority of wrongful convictions involved misidentification.  Margery Malkin 
Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent, 42 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 597–98 (2009) (discussing a National Institute of Justice study that 
reported that mistaken identification contributed to more than seventy-five percent of 183 DNA 
exonerations). 
 41. See JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFIELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 361 (2003) 
(noting that thirty-four percent of wrongful convictions “are obtained through forensics that is 
either incorrect or purposely falsified”). 
 42. See, e.g., Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 30–32 (1957) (per curiam) (describing a case in 
which the prosecutor instructed a testifying witness to not volunteer exculpatory evidence); see also 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111 (1935) (per curiam) (considering a petition for clemency 
based on the prosecutor’s use of perjured testimony and suppression of evidence that would 
impeach the lying witnesses).  The most fundamental form of prosecutorial misconduct during trial 
is the knowing use of perjured testimony.  George A. Weiss, Prosecutorial Accountability After 
Connick v. Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 199, 204, 207 (2011) (recognizing that subornation of 
perjury was the first type of prosecutorial misconduct that was determined to violate a defendant’s 
right to due process); see also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the 
Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1413, 1414–15 (2007) (identifying the testimony of lying expert witnesses as a 
contributing factor to wrongful convictions). 
 43. Michael Goldsmith, Reforming the Civil Rights Act of 1871: The Problem of Police 
Perjury, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1259, 1265–69 (2005) (citing “overwhelming anecdotal 
evidence of widespread police perjury in our criminal justice system”); Gershman, supra note 21, 
at 397–98 (describing a situation in which police bribed public officials). 
 44. Davis, supra note 14, at 410–12. 
 45. Weiss, supra note 42, at 120; see also Harmful Error, CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/accountability/harmful-error (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (providing 
several articles that discuss prosecutorial misconduct and its effect on society). 
 46. See Weiss, supra note 42, at 217 & n.210 (arguing that “widespread misconduct by 
prosecutors leads to a lack of public faith”). 
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psychological well-being. 47   While the courts afford “great deference” to 
prosecutors’ integrity,48 that trust is not always warranted.49 
For example, one national study cited over 11,000 cases of prosecutorial 
misconduct, reporting that prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in the reversal, 
dismissal, or reduction of the defendant’s sentence in roughly 2,000 of those 
cases. 50   Another nationwide survey, focusing on capital cases, revealed a  
sixty-eight percent rate of reversible error from prosecutorial misconduct.51  The 
study found that, between 1980 and 1999, twenty-one percent of the wrongful 
convictions considered were reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct.52  In a 
third study, the New York State Bar Association’s Task Force for Wrongful 
Convictions examined fifty-three cases of wrongful conviction, over half of 
which may have involved misconduct by the government.53 
III.  TYPES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
Prosecutorial misconduct includes, but is not limited to, Brady violations, 
overcharging, witness tampering, suborning perjury, Batson errors, improper 
argument, and the introduction of improper evidence. 
A.  Brady Violations: The Failure to Provide Required Discovery 
A prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence is the most frequent 
abuse of prosecutorial power.54  Although the disclosure requirement set forth 
in Brady v. Maryland55 and its progeny is well established, Brady violations 
 47. Id. at 217. 
 48. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364–65 (1991) (explaining that the deference 
awarded to prosecutors in the context of peremptory jury strikes, with which courts assume 
prosecutors act with great integrity and credibility). 
 49. See David G. Savage, Registry Tallies Over 2,000 Wrongful Convictions Since 1989, L.A. 
TIMES, May 20, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/20/nation/la-na-dna-revolution 
-20120521 (reporting that California, especially Los Angeles County, has exonerated a large 
number of wrongfully convicted defendants, in part because of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 50. Weiss, supra note 42, at 217–18.  The 2,000 cases cited did not include cases that were 
not reversed or cases in which misconduct, although present, was not the cause of reversal.  Id. at 
218.  Additionally, this figure may underestimate and neglect to distinguish between forms of 
misconduct.  Id. at 218–19. 
 51. Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death Penalty: What Went 
Wrong?, 34 MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 409–10 (2001). 
 52. Hartman & Richards, supra note 51, at 423. 
 53. TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF 
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTION 6–7 (2009) 
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR], available at 
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26663 (finding that “general errors by 
a government actor” contributed to wrongful conviction in thirty-one of the fifty-three cases in the 
study). 
 54. Davis, supra note 14, at 431 (noting that the breadth of the prosecutor’s obligations under 
Brady leave room for wrongdoing). 
 55. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
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continue to plague the criminal justice system.  Prosecutors are well aware that 
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment.”56  Prosecutors are also aware that they must disclose evidence that, 
if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.57  Furthermore, they 
are conscious of the significance of witness credibility and of their obligation to 
disclose evidence material to witness impeachment. 58   While the precise 
parameters of Brady continue to be refined, its basic premise is well defined and 
completely clear to criminal attorneys. 59  Ignorance of Brady obligations is 
seldom a reason for non-disclosure. 
The battle for discovery often focuses on the timing of the Brady disclosure.60  
Prosecutors may disclose the necessary discovery, but often do so too late in the 
pre-trial process to allow defense counsel to evaluate and utilize the material 
properly.61  Under these circumstances, the trial court could delay the trial to 
give defense counsel time to evaluate and possibly assimilate the newly acquired 
evidence into the defense case.  However, continuance of the trial date is at the 
discretion of the court, and, even if granted, may not be sufficient for defense 
counsel to make full use of the recently acquired material. 62   Furthermore, 
 56. Id. 
 57. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 677 (1985) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)) (explaining the requirement to disclose material information); see also 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (explaining that suppressing material evidence 
violates a defendant’s due process rights). 
 58. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (noting that nondisclosure of “evidence affecting credibility” 
violates Brady). 
 59. Attorneys in every state are required to comply with ethics rules.  See CPR POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE ADOPTION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND COMMENTS (2011), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that every state 
has adopted a version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct).  The ABA imposes 
additional ethical obligations on prosecutors, including the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence.  
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7–103(B) (2012) (“A public prosecutor or other 
government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, 
or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or 
other government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the 
offense, or reduce the punishment.”).  The ABA Model Rules also eliminate a prosecutor’s 
discretion with regard to disclosure requirements and expressly prohibits presentation of false 
testimony.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.8(d) (2013). 
 60. Michael A. Collora & William A. Haddad, Exculpatory Evidence—Getting It and Using 
It, CHAMPION, Mar. 2010, at 16, 17–18 (emphasizing the importance of timely Brady requests and 
disclosures for defense counsel). 
 61. Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New 
Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 543, 558–61 (2006) (discussing the effect of late discovery on an 
innocent defendant’s choice to plead guilty). 
 62. See id. at 600 n.238 (noting trial courts’ reluctance to change trial dates). 
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judges and court administrators are typically reticent to continue trials that 
complicate their calendars.63 
Additionally, exculpatory evidence may not come to light until after trial.  The 
only likely remedy in such cases is a new trial (if the disclosure so permits),64 or 
an appeal, in which the harmless error doctrine dramatically reduces the 
defendant’s chances of success.65  In yet other cases, prosecutors may never 
disclose discoverable materials. 
Typical sanctions for Brady violations might include a verbal admonition 
from a trial judge, or perhaps a rebuke by an appellate court, that will likely have 
no effect on the verdict under harmless error rationale.66  More severe sanctions 
are rare, and, as a result, prosecutors are emboldened by their success in 
obtaining guilty verdicts by unethical means.67 
B.  Overcharging 
The prosecutor’s exclusive role as the charging agent and as the negotiator in 
the inevitable case-disposition process is fraught with the potential for abuse.68  
The expectation of plea bargaining provides an incentive to prosecutors to better 
position themselves for negotiation. 69   Charging a greater offense than the 
defendant’s conduct warrants, or adding an enhancement of little merit, gives an 
unfair advantage to the prosecutor.70  Although it may seem counterintuitive to 
charge crimes that the prosecutor cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
overcharging forces the defendant to determine whether going to trial is worth 
 63. See Johns, supra note 9, at 66 (citing political concerns—the fear of appearing soft on 
crime—as one reason judges do not address misconduct); cf. Ginny Sloan, Congress Must Act to 
End Prosecutorial Misconduct, HUFF POST, (Apr. 11, 2012, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ginny-sloan/congress-must-act-to-end-_b_1415695.html (arguing 
that courts cannot solve the problem of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 64. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (authorizing a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires”). 
 65. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219–20 (1982). 
 66. See Davis, supra note 14, at 412 (noting that reversal following a Brady violation is rare); 
Gershman, supra note 21, at 424–25 (arguing that the harmless error rule indicates to prosecutors 
that their misconduct will be ignored). 
 67. See Davis, supra note 14.  A prosecutor may not be compelled to bring or drop charges 
and what charges to bring are vested upon his judgment.  McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,  
311–12 (1987); Gershman, supra note 21, at 408–11 nn.95–97. 
 68. See Gershman, supra note 21, at 405–06 (describing the prosecutor’s broad discretionary 
power). 
 69. H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the 
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 84 (2011). 
 70. Davis, supra note 14, at 413 (suggesting that prosecutors overcharge to create leverage 
for plea bargaining); see also Langer, supra note 26, at 240 (arguing that, because prosecutors 
control the charges in a criminal case, they have the ability to “threaten defendants with trial 
sentences that are not appropriate to the case”). 
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the risk of the devastating penalties the inflated charges carry.71  Given such a 
difficult choice, defendants may plead to charges beyond their level of 
culpability to eliminate the risk of greater consequences. 
Overcharging to gain a competitive advantage in the give-and-take of plea 
bargaining is an insidious abuse of the prosecutor’s power. 72   The MRPC 
requirement that prosecutors bring only those charges supported by probable 
cause 73  is inadequate to address overcharging because probable cause is a 
minimal threshold that is well below what is required to convict. 74  
Consequently, the MRPC is insufficient to deter unprincipled prosecutors from 
overcharging to gain a tactical advantage. 
C.  Witness Tampering 
Prosecutorial misconduct may extend as far as deliberate interference with or 
an attempt to influence the testimony of witnesses at trial.75  Prosecutors are 
ethically bound to communicate with witnesses and the defendant 
appropriately. 76   Improper witness examinations, misrepresentation of 
information, intimidation of witnesses, deliberate communication with the 
defendant outside the presence of counsel, or interference with defense counsel’s 
access to witnesses or defendants while preparing her case may all constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct.77 
The federal witness tampering statute criminalizes the use of intimidation or 
physical force with the intent to influence the testimony of a witness in any court 
proceeding.78  Acting with intent to influence a witness’s testimony means to act 
 71. Davis, supra note 14, at 413 (noting that, in situations in which prosecutors overcharge to 
gain leverage, defendants plead guilty out of “fear of being convicted of all of the charges brought 
in the indictment,” despite the fact that the prosecutor likely cannot prove these charges at trial). 
 72. Bibas, supra note 12, at 971 (characterizing this type of overcharging as coercive); 
Langer, supra note 26, at 233–41 (same). 
 73. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2013) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case 
shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable 
cause.”).  Once the prosecutor has established probable cause for a charge, courts generally defer 
to the prosecutor’s discretion in what charges to bring.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 
(1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring 
before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
 74. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 970–71; see also Davis, supra note 14, at 413–14 (observing 
that prosecutors typically charge offenses that they cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial). 
 75. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR, supra note 53, at 19 (citing 
“government practices,” including threatening and offering favors or benefits to witnesses, as a 
cause of wrongful convictions). 
 76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (defining the parameters in which a 
prosecutor may interact with the defendant and witnesses). 
 77. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)–(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (requiring proof, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that (1) the witness was scheduled to testify in court, (2) the offender used intimidation or 
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for the purpose of persuading the witness to change, color, or shade his testimony 
in some way.79  It is not necessary to prove that the witness’s testimony did, in 
fact, change. 
D.  Suborning Perjury 
The most basic form of prosecutorial misconduct is the prosecutor’s use of 
perjured testimony—conduct that clearly violates due process.80  Prosecutors 
have the duty to present true testimony, as well as the corresponding duty to 
correct false testimony.81  Thus, a prosecutor commits misconduct not only by 
soliciting false testimony, but also by presenting any testimony that he knows to 
be false or incorrect, 82  including evidence related solely to the witness’s 
credibility.83  For instance, if a witness falsely denies having received a deal in 
exchange for offering testimony, the prosecutor is obligated to report such 
perjury. 
Despite this duty, reports indicate that many times witnesses are, in fact, 
advised to testify falsely.  For example, in Napue v. Illinois, the defendant was 
convicted of murder primarily based on an accomplice’s testimony, even though 
the prosecution was aware that the witness intentionally committed perjury.84  
The accomplice testified that he was not promised anything in return for his 
testimony,85 while, in fact, he was promised a reduced sentence in exchange for 
his cooperation.86 
Similarly, in Miller v. Pate, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s 
conviction because of the prosecution’s misrepresentations to the jury at trial.87  
The prosecutor repeatedly led the jury to believe that the large stain on the 
physical force against the witness, and (3) the offender did so knowingly and willfully, with the 
intent to influence the witness’s testimony). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215–16 (1942) (concluding that the prosecution’s knowing 
use of perjured testimony constituted “a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution”); Weiss, supra note 42, at 204–05 (noting that subornation of perjury was the first 
form of prosecutorial misconduct to create a deprivation of due process); see also Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (per curiam) (“Safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against 
deprivation through the actions of the state embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which 
lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.”); Ridolfi & Possley, supra note 1, at 32 
(discussing the due process consequences of a prosecutor’s misrepresentation concerning the 
presumption of innocence). 
 81. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The prosecution cannot present evidence it 
knows is false and must immediately correct any falsity of which it is aware even if the false 
evidence was not intentionally submitted.”). 
 82. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (reversing and remanding the case because the 
prosecutor elicited testimony from a witness that misled the jury). 
 83. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269. 
 84. Id. at 265. 
 85. Id. at 270–71. 
 86. Id. at 265. 
 87. 386 U.S. 1, 3–4, 6 (1967). 
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defendant’s shorts was the victim’s blood. 88   The prosecutor relied on the 
emotional impact of the stain on the jury to obtain a death penalty conviction, 
despite knowing that most of the stains were actually paint.89 
E.  Improper Jury Selection 
Jury selection is another process ripe for abuse.  The push and pull for the 
“right” group of jurors tends to bring out competitive instincts in the advocates 
on both sides of the courtroom.90  The competitive instinct to “win” can often 
override any sense of fairness.91 
Challenging prospective jurors for legitimate reasons, such as an obvious 
conflict of interest, is far different from excluding jurors for illegitimate reasons, 
such as race, religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. 92   The challenge is 
greatest for prosecutors when the defendant belongs to a minority group and the 
prosecution is confronted with a prospective juror of the same race, or when a 
juror has strong religious convictions that may limit his ability to convict.93 
Using peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the grounds of 
bias against an identifiable group of people, based on race, religion, ethnicity, or 
similar grounds violates a defendant’s right to equal protection under the 
Constitution. 94   Inappropriate peremptory challenges may also violate the 
defendant’s right to be tried by a jury drawn from a representative  
cross-section of the community under the relevant state constitution.95  As set 
forth in Batson v. Kentucky, the Constitution “forbids the prosecutor to challenge 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 2–4, 6  Similarly, in Brown v. Borg, the prosecutor failed to disclose to the jury that 
some of the evidence presented was not actually stolen in the robbery that served as the basis for 
the defendant’s felony murder conviction.  951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991).  The court 
considered the prosecutor’s conduct “intolerable” and a perversion of “the adversarial system [that] 
endangers its ability to produce just results.”  Id. 
 90. See generally James R. Gadwood, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: Juryquest 
in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L. REV. 291, 291–98 (2008) (describing the different methods of jury 
selection). 
 91. See id. at 318–19 (concluding that both prosecutors and defense attorneys select jurors 
using improper methods). 
 92. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1349–50 (2009). 
 93. See id. 
 94. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that exclusion of jurors based 
on race can violate the Equal Protection Clause whether or not the defendant and the excluded juror 
are the same race); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (concluding that choosing jurors 
on racial grounds contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment); People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 115 (Cal. 
2009) (“Both the [California] and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges 
to remove prospective jurors based on group bias, such as race or ethnicity.”); People v. Hamilton, 
200 P.3d 898, 929 (Cal. 2009) (acknowledging that peremptory strikes based on race violate the 
defendant’s rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial). 
 95. Gadwood, supra note 90, at 318–19.  For example, the California Constitution considers 
a jury trial “an inviolate right.”  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
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potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that [same 
minority] jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case 
against a [same minority] defendant.”96  It is an unfortunate reality that many 
prosecutors will attempt to justify their illegitimate challenge by claiming some 
neutral reason, though still being motivated by the juror’s race or religion.97 
F.  Improper Argument 
The prosecution is bound to make only appropriate arguments to the judge or 
jury.98  One form of improper argument is the prosecutor’s endorsement of a 
witness’s truthfulness, as it is widely recognized that  “the prosecutor’s opinion 
carries with it the [weight] of the Government and may induce the jury to trust 
the Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.” 99  
Inappropriate strategy also includes testifying on behalf of an absent witness.100  
Similarly, a prosecutor commits misconduct by misstating the law, offering his 
personal opinion, impugning the defense to the jury, or appealing to religious 
authorities.101 
G.  Introduction of Improper Evidence 
The introduction of improper evidence during trial may entail using 
impermissible out-of-court statements in an attempt to prove a defendant’s bad 
character,102 or employing tactics to inflame the jury’s prejudice against the 
defendant.103  To bolster his case, a prosecutor may also introduce, or obtain via 
witness testimony, inadmissible or prejudicial evidence, even if he knows such 
 96. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89. 
 97. See Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 303–10 (2007). 
 98. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332–34 (1985). 
 99. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1985). 
 100. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 27–28.  Testifying for an absent witness denies 
the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine that witness.  Id. 
 101. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 22–23, 30–31; see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 5–200 (2013) (prohibiting attorneys from making a false statement of law to mislead 
the factfinder); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that a prosecutor’s misstatement 
of law could confuse the jury).  Such misconduct “tends to diminish the jury’s sense of 
responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied.”  People v. 
Wrest, 839 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1992); see also Sandoval v. Calderon, 231 F.3d 1140,  
1149–52 (9th Cir. 2000) (proscribing the prosecutor’s appeal to religious authority). 
 102. See, e.g., Good v. State, 723 S.W.2d 734, 735–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).  In Good, the 
prosecutor characterized the defendant’s attitude and character during his testimony as evidence of 
guilt.  Id. at 735.  The court concluded that the “prosecutor focused upon the demeanor appellant 
exhibited during the complainant’s testimony, characterizing it as ‘cold, unnerved, uncaring.’”  Id. 
at 736.  The court held that the prosecutor’s argument was improper.  Id. 
 103. See People v. Piper, 162 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (finding misconduct 
because the prosecutor failed to comply with the trial court’s order to refrain from referencing the 
defendant’s alcohol use, via the introduction of an exhibit, regardless of whether the reference was 
intentional). 
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evidence will immediately draw an objection from defense counsel and a 
curative instruction from the judge.104  Prosecutors who engage in this sort of 
misconduct are not concerned with the court’s invocation of prophylactic 
measures.  Rather, the prosecutor’s goal is simply to ensure that the jury hears 
the objectionable evidence.  Admonished or not, the prosecutor has spoken the 
words aloud to the jury, and the damage to the defendant is already done.  The 
same is true in proceedings in which the judge has already ruled that particular 
evidence is inadmissible, but the prosecutor ventures into the forbidden territory 
regardless of the ruling.105  The reasoning is the same; the prosecutor only wants 
the jury to hear the evidence, and he knows that the judge likely will not hand 
down anything more than a limiting curative instruction, which has a minimal 
impact in terms of correcting the misconduct. 
For example, even when a prosecutor has stipulated that an informant will not 
testify, the prosecutor may deliberately ignore his ethical obligation to abide by 
such a stipulation. 106   Likewise, it is improper for a prosecutor to ask 
“improperly argumentative” questions that are not designed to elicit helpful 
evidence.107  In fact, a prosecutor is bound to predict, within reason, whether a 
witness might engage in misconduct at trial, and to subsequently advise the 
witness to control his answers to provide admissible responses.108  Naturally, 
 104. Prosecutors cannot knowingly elicit improper evidence by intentionally eliciting 
testimony that the trial court previously ruled inadmissible.  People v. Bonin, 46 Cal. 3d 659, 689 
(1988) (finding misconduct because the prosecutor elicited testimony about the defendant’s other 
crimes); see also People v. Dagget, 275 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (admonishing 
the prosecutor for “unfairly [taking] advantage of the judge’s ruling” by asking the jury to draw an 
inference based on evidence that the judge had excluded); People v. Hudson, 179 Cal. Rptr. 95, 96–
100 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing the defendant’s conviction because of the prosecutor’s repeated 
attempts to elicit hearsay and disparaging character evidence). 
 105. People v. Luparello, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 839–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the 
prosecutor’s questioning violated the court’s directive regarding evidence of the  
codefendant’s prior bad acts); People v. Parsons, 203 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding misconduct because the prosecutor elicited evidence of the criminal defendant’s prior 
arrest, even though the prosecutor was aware that the trial court had ruled the evidence 
inadmissible). 
 106. See People v. Bell, 745 P.2d 573, 579 (Cal. 1987) (concluding that a prosecutor acted 
improperly because, after stipulating to the court that an informant’s testimony would not be 
introduced, he proceeded to read the informant’s statement to the jury by incorporating it into a 
question).  Similarly, a prosecutor commits misconduct by introducing evidence he promised not 
to introduce by agreement between himself and the defendant.  See People v. Quartermain, 941 
P.2d 788, 798–99 (Cal. 1997) (emphasizing that “when a prosecutor makes a promise that induces 
a defendant to waive a constitution protection and act to his or her determinant in reliance on that 
promise, the promise must be enforced” and vacating the defendant’s conviction because the 
prosecutor introduced the defendant’s incriminating statements after promising that he would not 
in exchange for the defendant’s waiver of his right to testify). 
 107. People v. Johnson, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (prohibiting questions 
that go “beyond an attempt to elicit facts within the [witness’s] knowledge and [are] instead 
designed to engage him in an argument”). 
 108. People v. Warren, 754 P.2d 218, 224–25 (Cal. 1988) (holding that a prosecutor “has the 
duty to guard against statements by his witnesses containing inadmissible evidence”). 
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should a witness commence such testimony without any warning, the prosecutor 
would not be liable for the inappropriate testimony. 
However, what constitutes inappropriate cross-examination of the defendant 
remains unclear.  The Ninth Circuit, for example, decided that the jury—not the 
prosecutor—must evaluate a defendant’s credibility, and therefore it would be 
misconduct for a prosecutor to attempt to discredit the defendant at trial.109 
IV.  SURVEY OF APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
One commentator recently observed that “[n]o institution or entity has yet 
established a system to examine the large percentage of wrongful convictions 
due to prosecutorial misconduct and to attempt to make recommendations to 
deter such misconduct.”110  Consequently, one can only guess the number of 
cases in which prosecutors’ misconduct results in wrongful convictions.  Despite 
the absence of a system that can accurately track the percentage of wrongful 
convictions, some scholars have noted efforts to investigate and sanction 
prosecutorial misconduct.111  Therefore, it is necessary to examine both past and 
present approaches to monitoring prosecutorial behavior before attempting to 
offer a solution. 
Every state has a bar association that, among other traditional responsibilities, 
is responsible for attorney discipline.112  Each year, over 125,000 complaints are 
lodged against the 1.3 million practicing attorneys in the United States. 113  
Nearly all of the complaints arise from civil cases.114  Prosecutor misconduct is 
not typically reported to state bar associations, and, even if it is reported, bar 
 109. See United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding misconduct 
because the prosecutor asked a witness whether another witness was lying, and then endorsed that 
witness’s testimony in his closing argument); People v. Zambrano, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 160, 170 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2004) (refusing to hold that all argumentative questions are improper because, on 
occasion, it is  “necessary to clarify a witness’s testimony”). Zambrano can be distinguished 
because the prosecutor’s questions were clearly impermissible because they were intended only to  
“berate [the] defendant . . . and to force him to call the [police] officers liars in an attempt to inflame 
the passions of the jury.”  Id.; see also United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that it was erroneous to request a witness to testify to the veracity of another witness’s 
statements because this type of credibility determination is the responsibility of the jury); United 
States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219–21 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by compelling a witness to give his opinion of another witness’s credibility); 
People v. Foster, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 535, 539–40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing several lines of 
“‘were they lying’ questions” cases). 
 110. Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 285. 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 286–88 (discussing the ABA’s efforts to establish standardized ethical 
guidelines for prosecutors). 
 112. See Brian K. Pinaire, Milton Heumann & Christian Scarlett, “Philadelphia Lawyers”: 
Policing the Law in Pennsylvania, 2012 A.B.A. J. PROF. LAW. 137, 148–49 (2012) (explaining that 
many states established bar associations in reaction to an ABA Commission report, known as the 
“Clark Report,” that revealed that discipline for attorney misconduct was virtually nonexistent). 
 113. Id. at 148. 
 114. Id. (noting that private citizens are largely responsible for these complaints). 
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associations generally do not investigate the claims or initiate disciplinary 
proceedings.115 
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) Center for Professional 
Responsibility has collected and analyzed national data concerning attorney 
misconduct.116  Although the scope of this information is certainly expansive, 
the submission of information is purely voluntary and therefore limits the utility 
of the analysis.117  For example, if a particular jurisdiction does not maintain the 
category of data requested (or should a jurisdiction not engage in certain 
activities), the Commission can only estimate the relevant data in an effort to 
render an integrated and meaningful statistical analysis.118  The Commission 
publishes its results in the ABA Survey on Lawyer Disciplinary Systems (SOLD), 
which details the scope of each jurisdiction’s disciplinary enforcement policies, 
caseload tally, and budgetary information.119 
The state bar association model has little impact on prosecutors, partly 
because of the type of complaint that triggers a bar association inquiry.  Civil 
complaints generally focus on financial matters, such as complaints over fees or 
commingling of assets, which bar associations are equipped to address. 120  
Conversely, victims of prosecutorial misconduct typically report misconduct 
directly to the trial or appellate court hearing their cases because no state has 
established a disciplinary system to specifically address alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct.121 
With rare exceptions, it is left to supervisors in prosecutors’ offices to 
investigate and, if appropriate, sanction errant prosecutors.122  However, internal 
investigations are suboptimal.123  For example, one study of the efficacy of 
 115. Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, States Can Discipline Federal Prosecutors, Rarely Do, 
U.S.A. TODAY (Dec. 8, 2010, 11:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington 
/judicial/2010-12-09-RW_prosecutorbar09_ST_N.htm. 
 116. STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, 2009 SURVEY ON LAWYER 
DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (2010) [hereinafter 2009 SOLD REPORT], available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/discipline/2009sold.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 117. See 2009 ABA Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.), AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/survey_lawyer_discipli
ne_systems_2009.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  Other categories include lawyer population, case-processing statistics, sanctions 
imposed, and disciplinary counsel, among other categories.  Id. 
 120. See 2009 SOLD REPORT, supra note 116, at 3 (reporting that 857 attorneys in New York’s 
First Judicial Department were suspended for failing to pay registration fees). 
 121. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 285 (“No institution has yet established a system to 
examine the large percentage of wrongful convictions due to prosecutorial misconduct and to 
attempt to make recommendations to deter such misconduct.”). 
 122. See Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors will be Disciplined 
by Their Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 537, 542–43 (2011) (emphasizing prosecutors’ offices’ inability to effectively sanction and 
deter misconduct). 
 123. Id. at 542. 
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internal investigation found that, of 381 cases in which convictions were 
overturned because the prosecutor concealed or falsified evidence, only three 
prosecutors were minimally reprimanded and no prosecutor was disbarred or 
publicly sanctioned.124 
Prosecutorial misconduct is particularly prevalent in California, Illinois, and 
New York.125  California’s Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
studied 2,131 cases in which allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were 
raised. 126   Appellate courts found prosecutorial misconduct in 444 of these 
cases, overturning fifty-four.127  Although California law requires allegations of 
misconduct to be reported to, and investigated by, the state bar association, the 
study revealed that none of the fifty-four overturned cases was referred to the 
bar association.128 
Perhaps recognizing that their attorneys lack meaningful oversight, some 
states have taken additional steps to restructure their attorney disciplinary 
schemes.  Some states collaborate with their bar associations, while others have 
created committees, independent of their state bars, that are under the direct 
supervision of the states’ highest courts.129  A number of states have instituted 
disciplinary schemes independent of the traditional bar association model.130  
However, because these schemes still address both civil and criminal matters, 
meaningful oversight and discipline of prosecutors continues to be elusive. 
A.  Colorado 
In January 1999, Colorado established a new Attorney Regulation Counsel, 
which investigates attorney misconduct and recommends sanctions to the state’s 
 124. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Part 1: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 
1999, at C1. 
 125. See id. (revealing that New York and Illinois ranked highest for reversals attributed to 
prosecutorial misconduct); Savage, supra note 49 (reporting that California, especially Los Angeles 
County, follows just behind Illinois in the greatest number of exonerations attributable to 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 126. CAL. COMM. ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 71 (Gerald Uelmen & 
Chris Boscia eds., 2008) [hereinafter CAL. FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.ccfaj. 
org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. An independent study revealed that about half of the states have created disciplinary 
systems under the direct supervision of the state’s highest court.  These states include Arkansas, 
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  See generally AM. BAR 
ASS’N, DIRECTORY OF LAWYER DISCIPLINARY AGENCIES 2012-13 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/directory
_of_lawyer_disciplinary_agencies.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 130. Jennifer M. Kraus, Attorney Discipline Systems: Improving Public Perception and 
Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 273, 278–82 (2000) (discussing the disciplinary schemes 
in Colorado, Minnesota, Michigan, Indiana, California, Montana, Pennsylvania, and New York). 
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Regulation Committee.131  The Counsel reviews all attorney grievances, not just 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 132   The Counsel adjudicates formal 
charges by three-member panels comprised of one sitting judge and two 
members appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court from a pool of lawyers and 
members of the public.133  Since the implementation of the new scheme, more 
than two hundred attorneys have been investigated and prosecuted.134  Between 
March and September of 2012, twenty-nine Colorado attorneys who engaged in 
misconduct were sanctioned, including private and public admonition and 
suspensions. 135   However, none of these attorneys were prosecutors. 136  
Moreover, although Colorado also created a separate council within the district 
attorney’s office to “promote, foster, and encourage an effective administration 
of criminal justice,” the council is not responsible for disciplinary measures.137 
B.  Minnesota 
Like Colorado, Minnesota abandoned the state bar model and instituted a 
disciplinary system with several components that execute different disciplinary 
functions.138  Minnesota’s Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board (LPRB), 
which is comprised of twenty-three members appointed by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, oversees attorney discipline. 139   The Board is divided into 
several three-member panels that preside over hearings to determine whether 
there is probable cause for public discipline.140  In 2008, the Supreme Court 
 131. Id. at 280.  The Regulation Committee is responsible for screening and investigating 
complaints.  Id.  The Committee is comprised of six attorneys and three members of the public.  Id. 
 132. See id. (making no distinction between civil and criminal attorneys); Colorado Supreme 
Court – Attorney Regulation Counsel, COLO. SUP. CT., http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com 
/Regulation/Regulation.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (same). 
 133. Kraus, supra note 130, at 280; see also Press Release, Colo. Judicial Branch, Colo. 
Supreme Court Selects William R. Lucero as Presiding Disciplinary Judge (Feb. 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/Press_Releases.cfm?year=2004 (select “Feb 04” 
tab and click on the corresponding link). 
 134. Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, COLO. SUP. CT., http://www.colorado 
supremecourt.com/PDJ/pdj.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  Opinions and reports released on this 
website indicate 232 opinions, many of which imposed sanctions.  Id. 
 135. Id.  An independent search of all of the posted opinions indicated that twenty-nine cases 
resulted in sanctions. 
 136. Id. 
 137. About CDAC, COLO. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S COUNCIL, http://www.cda 
cweb.com/CDAC/AboutCDAC.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  The Council provides services 
for effective prosecution, including training, legal research, and management assistance.  Id. 
 138. About the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, MINN. OFF. LAWS. PROF. RESP., 
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 139. Id.  The Board is comprised of fourteen lawyer members and nine non-lawyer members.  
Id. 
 140. Id.  More than 327 lawyers and non-lawyers dedicate their time to investigating 
complaints and provide recommendations based on their expertise of appropriate disciplinary 
actions for the board to consider.  Kent Gernander & Charles Lundberg, What Works Well and Why, 
BENCH & BAR (Feb. 2006), http://www.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2006/feb06/prof_response.htm. 
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Advisory Committee concluded that Minnesota’s disciplinary system was 
“‘healthy’ and working well.”141  In 2011, the LPRB received 1,337 complaints 
alleging misconduct.142  Twenty-six attorneys were publicly disciplined, but 
only two attorneys were disbarred, on the basis of dishonesty and 
misappropriation and disciplinary history.143  None of the disciplined attorneys 
were prosecutors.144 
C.  Indiana 
Indiana has also shifted disciplinary authority from the state bar association 
to the judicial branch. 145   However, once again, the investigative and 
disciplinary functions do not distinguish between civil and criminal attorneys, 
or between prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys.146  In 2011, the Indiana 
Judicial Branch Disciplinary Commission filed sixty-three verified complaints 
of attorney misconduct with the Indiana Supreme Court, including at least one 
against a prosecuting attorney.147  However, that prosecutor received a 120-day 
suspension for his actions as a private practitioner, not for prosecutorial 
misconduct.148 
D.  Montana 
On July 1, 2002, the Montana Supreme Court also created an attorney 
regulation system independent of the state bar association. 149   Like its 
 141. REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE LAWYER 
DISCIPLINE SYSTEM 11 (2008), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Supreme 
%20Court%20Advisory%20Report/Supreme%20Court%20Advisory%20Commitee%20Report.p
df (characterizing district ethics committees as vital and urging continuation of the system).  In 
2011, the Director’s Office implemented eighty-two percent of the District Ethics Committees 
recommendations.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD 
24 (2012), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Documents/2012%20Annual%20 
Report.pdf. 
 142. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD, supra note 
141, at 2 (noting that this was a slight decrease from 2010, in which 1,365 complaints were filed). 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. See id. at A7. 
 145. See Donald R. Lundberg, Two Case Studies in the Exercise of Discretion in Lawyer 
Discipline Systems, 2009 A.B.A. J. PROF. LAW. 107, 107 n.2, 108 (2009) (describing Indiana’s 
attorney discipline system). 
 146. See id. at 113–20 (describing Indiana’s discipline scheme with regard to attorneys in 
general, not solely prosecutors). 
 147. INDIANA SUPREME COURT, 2010–2011 ANNUAL REPORT 37–39 (2011), available at 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/supreme/files/1011report.pdf. 
 148. Id.  The sanctioned attorney negotiated a contract to bring civil forfeiture suits against 
criminal defendants’ property as a private practitioner.  Id. 
 149. OFF. OF DISCIPLINARY COUNS. FOR THE ST. OF MONT., ODC’S 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 1 
(2012), available at http://montanaodc.org/Portals/ODC/2011%20Annual%20Report.pdf.  Before 
July 1, 2002, the State Bar Association was the primary attorney disciplinary regime in Montana.  
Id. at 16.  The state restructured its disciplinary regime to include the Office of Disciplinary Counsel 
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counterparts in other states, the Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel also 
addresses the misconduct of both civil and criminal attorneys.150  In 2011, only 
six percent of the complaints filed alleged misconduct by prosecuting attorneys, 
none of whom were sanctioned publicly.151 
E.  West Virginia 
In a few states, special prosecutors are appointed by court order in situations 
in which the previously assigned prosecutor is unfit to continue.152  In West 
Virginia, judges are responsible for the investigation and discipline of 
prosecutors in their courtrooms.153  Specifically, judges have the authority to 
remove prosecutors and to appoint special prosecutors if misconduct occurs.154  
However, the West Virginia Supreme Court is generally reluctant to exercise 
this authority and has limited the scope of its power to the disqualification of 
prosecutors with conflicts of interest.155  Additionally, the court has established 
constitutional protections for the accused attorney, which require notice and an 
opportunity for a hearing before the court can disqualify him and appoint a 
special prosecutor to continue the case.156 
and the Commission on Practice under the supervision of the Supreme Court of Montana.  Id.  In 
2011, reports indicated that, between 1992 and 2002, there were approximately fifty-eight public 
disciplinary orders against Montana lawyers.  Id. at 8.  However, from 2003 to 2011, reports 
indicated 144 public disciplinary rulings, an increase since the new regime was enacted.  Id. 
 150. Id. at 1–3 (failing to differentiate between criminal and civil attorneys).  From 2007 to 
2011, over fifty percent of complainants were current or former clients alleging misconduct on 
behalf of their retained attorneys.  Id. at 12.  Only an average of two percent of complaints were 
received from the courts.  Id. 
 151. Id. at 13. 
 152. See Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the 
Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 145–46 (2007).  The appointment of a special prosecutor is 
not limited to disqualifications based on misconduct.  See id. at 146.  For example, in North 
Carolina, the Special Prosecution Division was not enacted to investigate and discipline 
misconduct, but rather to expedite trials and provide trial assistance and resources for complex 
issues.  Id.  This discussion of special prosecutors is limited to those states that use special 
prosecutors to tackle prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom.  Compare W. VA. CODE ANN.  
§ 7-7-8 (LexisNexis 2010) (vesting the power to appoint a special prosecutor in judicial officials), 
with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550 (West 2011) (vesting the power to appoint a special prosecutor in 
the attorney general), and Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 1007 (N.Y. 1997) (concluding 
that supersession was appropriate in a death penalty case in which the prosecutor threatened the 
“faithful execution of the death penalty law”). 
 153. W. VA. CODE § 7-7-8 (“If, in any case, the prosecuting attorney and his assistants are 
unable to act, or if in the opinion of the court it would be improper for him or his assistants to act, 
the court shall appoint some competent practicing attorney to act in that case.”). 
 154. Id.; see also Dennis, supra note 152, at 149–50 (citing West Virginia as an example of a 
state that vests the power to appoint special prosecutors in the state judiciary). 
 155. Dennis, supra note 152, at 15 (indicating that a conflict of interest arises only if “the 
prosecutor has a direct personal interest in the proceeding”). 
 156. Dennis, supra note 152, at 150; see Ex rel. Brown v. Merrifield, 389 S.E.2d 484, 487 (W. 
Va. 1990) (explaining that the judge acted outside of the scope of his authority under  
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F.  New York 
New York has addressed attorney misconduct by creating several grievance 
committees that are responsible for investigating reported misconduct and 
disciplining offending attorneys. 157   Despite these general efforts to reduce 
misconduct, New York has failed to address prosecutorial misconduct 
specifically.158  The state generally delegates the oversight of prosecutors to 
individual district attorneys’ offices.159  However, these offices continually fail 
to report misconduct to the proper disciplinary authority and to discipline their 
prosecutors for discovered misconduct.160  According to a study conducted by 
the New York State Bar Association’s Task Force on Wrongful Conviction,161 
of fifty-three cases that resulted in a wrongful conviction, no public disciplinary 
steps were taken against the prosecutors, only one prosecutor was referred to a 
disciplinary committee, and only one prosecutor was sanctioned internally.162 
G.  Illinois 
Illinois imposes statutory requirements on legal professionals to report certain 
instances of attorney misconduct.163  Attorneys who breach their duty to report 
are subject to suspension.164  In 1999, an elaborate study by the Chicago Tribune 
of the fifty-nine attorney disciplinary agencies nationwide revealed that Illinois 
was second only to New York in the number of wrongful convictions attributed 
§ 7-7-8 because he appointed a special prosecutor without providing the former prosecutor with 
notice or the opportunity for a hearing). 
 157. Attorney Grievance Committees: Complaints About Attorneys, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED 
COURT SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/attorneygrievance/complaints.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 
2014); Rudin, supra note 122, at 547 (noting that the grievance committees are tasked with 
investigating and disciplining misconduct and may initiate investigations without a formal 
complaint).  The appropriate grievance office with which to file a complaint alleging misconduct 
depends on the location of the lawyer’s office.  Attorney Grievance Committees, supra. 
 158. Rudin, supra note 122, at 541–42.  According to the New York State Bar Association 
Task Force on Wrongful Convictions, no public disciplinary action had been taken against 
prosecutors.  Id. 
 159. Id. at 541. 
 160. Id. at 541–42 (quoting FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR, supra note 53, at 
29) (“‘[T]here is little to no risk to the specific [prosecutor] involved resulting form a failure to 
follow the [Brady] rule.’”). 
 161. FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR, supra note 53, at 29.  The Task Force 
surveyed district attorneys’ offices across New York, inquiring whether the office had ever imposed 
sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct.  Id.  Twenty offices responded to the questionnaire, and 
one office declined to respond because of pending litigation.  Id. 
 162. See Rudin, supra note 122, at 541–42.  The study revealed that thirty-one of the  
fifty-three cases were overturned for, at least in part, “governmental practices,” defined to include 
the use of false testimony by prosecutors, Brady violations, improper handling of evidence, and 
failure to investigate alternative suspects.  Id. at 541. 
 163. ILL. S. CT. R. P. 8.3(a) (“A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a 
violation . . . shall inform the appropriate authority.”). 
 164. See In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 795–96 (suspending an attorney for one year for 
failing to report misconduct). 
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to prosecutorial misconduct.165  The five-part article revealed a thirty-six-year 
history of misconduct and an ongoing lack of oversight of Illinois prosecutors.166  
Illinois tried forty-six of the 381 overturned homicide convictions the article 
examined—twice as many convictions overturned by the third-ranked state.167  
At least a dozen of the prosecutors involved in these cases underwent additional 
investigation, but none were publicly censured or disbarred.168 
In 2002, to better address misconduct, Illinois enacted a “duty to report” 
provision that requires attorneys to report certain known misconduct by fellow 
attorneys to the Illinois Disciplinary Commission. 169   Since the provision’s 
enactment, judges and attorneys have filed over 5,000 reports of alleged attorney 
misconduct. 170   Seven hundred and twenty five of those reports alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct.171  However, only a handful have been investigated.  
 165. Possley & Armstrong, supra note 124. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.  One prosecutor was fired, but was later reinstated with back pay.  Id.  One prosecutor 
received a thirty-day, in-house suspension.  Id.  Two prosecutors were criminally indicted, but the 
charges were dropped before trial.  Id.  The final prosecutor was suspended for fifty-nine days, as 
a consequence of additional instances of misconduct unrelated to the wrongful conviction.  Id. 
 169. ILL. S. CT. R. P. 8.3. 
 170. ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2012 
ANNUAL REPORT 27 Chart 25 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2012.pdf (reporting 5,193 attorney reports filed from 2003 to 
2012). 
 171. See id. at 13 Chart 9 (seventy-one allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y 
REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2011 ANNUAL 
REPORT 17 Chart 9 (2012), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2011.pdf (sixty-four 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 17 Chart 9 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT], available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2010.pdf (ninety-nine allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF ILL., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 16 Chart 9 (2010), available at 
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2009.pdf (seventy-five allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 
2008 ANNUAL REPORT 9 Chart 9 (2009), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport 
2008.pdf (sixty-five allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND 
DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 11 Chart 9 (2008) 
[hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL REPORT], available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport 
2007.pdf (sixty-four allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND 
DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 7 Chart 2 (2007), 
available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2006.pdf (fifty-one allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 
2005 ANNUAL REPORT 6 Chart 2 (2006), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport 
2005.pdf (forty-seven allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND 
DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 6 Chart 2 (2005), 
available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2004.pdf (sixty-nine allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct); ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 
2003 ANNUAL REPORT 7 Chart 2 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport2003.pdf (fifty-three allegations of prosecutorial misconduct); 
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Annual reports indicate that only three prosecutors have been sanctioned and 
only one prosecutor has been suspended for misconduct.172 
H.  Texas 
Although a few states have ventured from the mainstream, only Texas and the 
Federal Department of Justice have implemented separate disciplinary schemes 
for prosecutors.173  In 1977, Texas created the Texas Prosecutor Council, which 
was responsible for regulating prosecutorial conduct. 174   Although this 
committee was created primarily to assist and educate Texas prosecutors, it also 
accepted claims of misconduct and instituted a procedure for addressing 
complaints.175  The Council was composed of a combination of lay citizens and 
prosecuting attorneys.176  Any member of the public could file a complaint 
alleging prosecutorial misconduct with the Council. 177   Upon receipt of a 
complaint, the Council would conduct an investigation into the allegation of 
misconduct. 178   The Council had the authority to privately reprimand the 
attorney, hold a hearing before the Council, or hold a formal hearing before a 
ATT’Y REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ILL., 2002 ANNUAL 
REPORT 6 Chart 2 (2003), available at https://www.iardc.org/AnnualReport 
2002.pdf (sixty-seven allegations of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 172. See 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 170, at 25 Chart 23 (one prosecutor censured for 
misconduct); 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 28 Chart 23 (one prosecutor suspended for 
misconduct); 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 20 Chart 23 (two prosecutors censured for 
“failure to disclose exculpatory evidence”); 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 171, at 14 Chart 14 
(one prosecutor censured for misconduct). 
 173. Texas is the only state to establish a committee solely devoted to state prosecutors.  Steele, 
supra note 21, at 983 n.119 (conducting an informal survey of state disciplinary systems and 
concluding that no state had established a centralized agency comparable to the Texas agency); see 
infra text and accompanying notes 191, 197–200 (discussing the establishment of the DOJ’s 
Professional Misconduct Review Unit).  An independent search through Westlaw and the 
nationwide listed disciplinary agencies confirms Steele’s findings. 
 174. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. art. 332d (West 1984) (repealed 1985).  In 1977, the  
Sixty-Fifth Texas Legislature created the Texas Prosecutors Coordinating Council, which was 
designed to be an agency solely responsible for the conduct of Texas prosecutors.  See S.B. 113, 
65th Leg. (Tex. 1977).  In 1981, the Sixty-Seventh Legislature renamed the body the “Texas 
Prosecutor Council.”  Texas Prosecutor Council, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/tslac/10174/10174-P.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  The Council 
did not expressly proscribe certain conduct, but rather accepted complaints and investigated 
instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct.  TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. art. 332d § 8(4). 
 175. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. art. 332d, § 8. 
 176. TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 3(a) (requiring the council to be comprised of “four 
citizens of the State of Texas, who are not licensed to practice law, appointed by the Governor of 
Texas, with the advice and consent of the senate” and “five incumbent, elected prosecuting 
attorneys to be elected by prosecuting attorneys, at least one of each of whom shall be a county 
attorney, a district attorney, and a criminal district attorney”). 
 177. See TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 8(4) (failing to define who can file charges). 
 178. See id. 
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specially appointed master. 179   The Council was responsible for operations 
related to Texas prosecutors until 1986, when budget cuts resulted in 
restructuring and prosecutorial oversight was once again delegated to the Texas 
State Bar.180  Unfortunately, Texas’s annual reports do not include sanctions or 
results of formal hearings. 
The State Bar of Texas has reported that only three prosecutors have been 
reprimanded for misconduct after the abolishment of the Prosecutor’s 
Council. 181   However, the Texas Tribune discovered that prosecutorial 
misconduct contributed to a wrongful conviction in nearly a quarter of the 
eighty-six convictions overturned between 1989 and 2011.182  At least one Texas 
scholar attributes this high level of misconduct to the lack of oversight of 
prosecutors. 183   The Texas Tribune’s investigation further revealed that no 
prosecutor involved with the eighty-six improperly prosecuted cases was 
disciplined in any form.184 
I.  Federal Government 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has also grappled with the 
issue of prosecutorial misconduct.  As early as 1994, Congress recognized the 
need for an independent committee to review the actions of federal prosecutors, 
and it considered adding a provision to the Independent Counsel Reauthorization 
Act to require the Attorney General to appoint independent counsel to 
 179. See TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 10(g)(1) (“After investigation of a complaint of 
prosecutor incompetency or misconduct, the council may, in its discretion, issue a private 
reprimand, order a hearing to be held before the council, or request the supreme court to appoint a 
master to hold a hearing.”).  If the council considered a formal hearing necessary, it was required 
to notify the prosecutor of the complaint against him and the date of the hearing.  TEXAS CONST. 
& CIV. STAT. § 10(h).  In a formal hearing, evidence and witnesses were to be presented in 
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.  TEXAS CONST. & CIV. STAT. § 10(g). 
 180. See Texas Prosecutor Council, supra note 174.  In 1984, the Texas Sunset Advisory 
Commission reviewed the Prosecutor Council and decided to transfer the Council’s responsibilities 
to other state agencies in efforts to save costs.  Id.  On September 1, 1985, the agency was abolished 
and its responsibilities were delegated to the State Bar of Texas, Office of Attorney General, and 
Texas Judicial Council.  Id. 
 181. Brandi Grissom, Courts Found DA Error in Nearly 25% of Reversed Cases, TEX. TRIB., 
July 5, 2012, http://www.texastribune.org/2012/07/05/courts-found-prosecutors-erred-25 
-exonerations/ (noting that none of the three sanctioned prosecutors were involved in the eighty-six 
convictions overturned between 1989 and 2011). 
 182. Id. (identifying twenty-one cases in which prosecutorial misconduct contributed to a 
wrongful conviction).  The prosecutors in these cases “broke basic legal and ethical rules” by 
suppressing evidence and testimony and making improper statements to the jury.  Id.  In seventeen 
of the twenty-one cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor withheld exculpatory 
evidence from the defense.  Id. 
 183. Id. (quoting Jennifer Laurin, a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, who 
stated that there is “next to no oversight” of prosecutors). 
 184. Id. (noting that the Texas State Bar “reports very little public discipline of prosecutors in 
recent history”). 
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investigate claims of prosecutorial misconduct.185  However, the Act as passed 
did not include this provision.186 
Likewise, the Citizens Protection Act of 1998, as enacted, omitted a review 
board for alleged prosecutorial misconduct.187  As originally drafted, the Act 
included a Misconduct Review Board that was responsible for reviewing the 
Attorney General’s decisions regarding complaints of prosecutorial 
misconduct.188  The proposal invited the public to lodge complaints with the 
Attorney General against any Justice Department attorney who engaged in 
specified forms of misconduct.189  If the Attorney General found misconduct, he 
would either impose the appropriate sanction or, if criminal prosecution was 
necessary, refer the matter to the grand jury.190 
In 2011, the DOJ established the Professional Misconduct Review Unit 
(PMRU), an internal unit designed to impose swift and consistent sanctions for 
prosecutorial misconduct. 191   Before the PMRU, DOJ supervisors were 
responsible for punishing attorneys for misconduct identified and investigated 
by the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).192  The OPR investigated 
alleged misconduct and reported its results and recommendations for 
punishment to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General and the appropriate 
component head, and the attorney’s supervisor determined the appropriate 
 185. Morton, supra note 14, at 1113 (noting concern for the growing number of cases of 
misconduct, corruption, and fraud). 
 186. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 594 et seq. (2006)) (failing to include a provision addressing prosecutorial 
misconduct). 
 187. Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-119 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006)) (failing to include a prosecutorial misconduct review board). 
 188. Citizens Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3396, 105th Cong. § 203. 
 189. H.R. 3396, § 202.  The original version of the Citizens Protection Act made it punishable 
conduct to: 
(1) in the absence of probable cause seek the indictment of any person; (2) fail promptly 
to release information that would exonerate a person under indictment; (3) intentionally 
mislead a court as to the guilt of any person; (4) intentionally or knowingly misstate 
evidence; (5) intentionally or knowingly alter evidence; (6) attempt to influence or color 
a witness’s testimony; (7) act to frustrate or impede a defendant’s right to discovery; (8) 
offer or provide sexual activities to any government witness or potential witness; (9) leak 
or otherwise improperly disseminate information to any person during an investigation; 
or (10) engage in conduct that discredits the Department. 
H.R. 3396, § 201(a). 
 190. See H.R. 3396, § 201(b) (listing the penalties available to the attorney general); H.R. 3396, 
§ 201(b)(7) (instructing the attorney general to refer allegations to the grand jury). 
 191. Memorandum from the Attorney General, to H. Marshall Jarrett, Dir., Exec. Office for 
U.S. Att’ys et al. (Jan. 14., 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/pmru 
-creation.pdf. 
 192. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OPR ANNUAL REPORT 
2011, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011], available at http://www.justice 
.gov/opr/annualreport2011.pdf. 
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sanction. 193   If a disagreement arose between the OPR Counsel and the 
prosecutor’s supervisor concerning the investigation or the disciplinary 
recommendation, the supervisor could submit a request to depart from the report 
to an Associate Deputy Attorney General (ADAG), who would determine 
whether the supervisor could deviate from the OPR’s recommendation.194  If the 
prosecutor had simply exercised poor judgment, the OPR would defer to the 
attorney’s supervisor.195  The involvement of department supervisors, ADAGs, 
and the OPR, for which discipline was just one responsibility among many, 
resulted in delays and inconsistencies in punishment.196 
By contrast, the DOJ’s current approach shifts the adjudicatory function from 
the attorneys’ supervisors to the PMRU.  The sole function of the PMRU is to 
discipline professional misconduct.197  If OPR finds in its initial investigation 
that a prosecutor has engaged in intentional or reckless conduct, it refers the 
matter to the PMRU to discipline the attorney in a timely, fair, and consistent 
manner.198  The PMRU may determine the appropriate sanction from a range of 
specified discipline recommendations, but it is not required to adhere to the 
OPR’s recommendation. 199   PMRU officials may act outside of the OPR’s 
recommended range of punishment, provided that it notifies the Office of the 
Deputy Attorney General before implementing discretionary action.200 
In 2011, the OPR received 1,381 complaints alleging attorney misconduct.201  
OPR opened investigations for twenty of these cases and flagged an additional 
 193. Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 191 (noting that, if OPR found 
misconduct, it would recommend a range of possible sanctions).  A component head was the Office 
of the Deputy Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General, the Director of EOUSA, or any 
other appropriate component head.  Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. (explaining that OPR would return the matter to the attorney’s supervisor “for any 
appropriate action”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (“The creation of a PMRU exclusively dedicated to the resolution of disciplinary 
matters arising out of findings of professional misconduct within established time limitations will 
not only reduce delays but also permit consistent resolution of matters involving similarly situated 
employees.”). 
 198. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192 (explaining that the OPR refers cases 
involving intentional or reckless misconduct to the PMRU for determination of punishment); see 
Memorandum from the Attorney General, supra note 191 (emphasizing the PMRU’s deadlines and 
the importance of its compliance with those deadlines). 
 199. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192 (noting that the OPR’s recommendation is 
not binding on the PMRU). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  Of these 1,381 complaints, 720 (fifty-two percent) were filed by incarcerated persons.  
Id.  Additionally, some complaints were not matters within the jurisdiction of the OPR and were 
referred to the appropriate agency.  Id. 
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149 for further review.202  OPR found misconduct in eleven of these cases.203  
At the close of 2011, two federal attorneys had been disciplined and six attorneys 
had a disciplinary action pending against them. 204   Of the two attorneys 
disciplined, one received a written reprimand and the other was suspended.205  
Two of the six attorneys awaiting disciplinary action were alleged to have 
committed reckless professional misconduct during the prosecution of Senator 
Ted Stevens.206  Ultimately, the OPR found that the two prosecutors failed to 
provide the defense with exculpatory evidence, which caused the PMRU to 
suspend them.207 
While shifting the initial investigation from a supervisor—who has a 
relationship with the prosecutor—to a more detached committee is more likely 
to ensure an objective investigation, the DOJ scheme is still entirely internal, 
 202. Id. at 5.  Of the 149 cases flagged for further review, fifty were obtained through judicial 
opinions and referrals by department employees of judicial criticism, twenty-one were filed by 
private attorneys, forty-five were referrals from department components unrelated to judicial 
findings, twenty were complaints filed by private individuals, five were allegations from other 
agencies, and eight complaints issued from other sources.  OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 
192, at 8 tbl.1.  The most common types of complaint alleged Brady violations, Giglio violations, 
and discovery violations under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.  OPR ANNUAL REPORT 
2011, supra note 192, at 2. 
 203. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192, at 14 (reporting that, of the eleven 
misconduct findings, four involved intentional professional misconduct by a departmental attorney, 
and nine involved reckless disregard for an applicable obligation).  The 2011 statistics were 
comparable to past years.  Compare id. (finding professional misconduct in eleven of the 169 cases 
opened as inquiries or investigations in 2011), with OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 5, 9 (2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/annualreport2010.pdf (finding professional misconduct in  
twenty-four of the 183 cases opened as inquiries or investigations in 2010), and OFFICE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2009, at 6, 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/annualreport2009.pdf (finding professional misconduct in twelve of the 
245 cases opened as inquires or investigations in 2009). 
 204. OPR ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 192, at 15–16.  Disciplinary action was ordered 
for one of the eleven attorneys, but he resigned before it could be implemented.  Id. at 15.  
Additionally, disciplinary action was not initiated against two attorneys because they were no 
longer employees of the department.  Id. at 16. 
 205. Id. at 16. 
 206. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN UNITED STATES V. THEODORE F. STEVENS 
671–72 (2011), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/052412-081511 
Report.pdf. 
 207. Elizabeth Murphy, OPR Report Finds “Reckless” Misconduct by AUSAs in Botched 
Stevens Case, MAIN JUSTICE (May 24, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com 
/2012/05/24/opr-report-finds-reckless-misconduct-by-ausas-in-botched-stevens-case/.  AUSA 
Joseph Bottini was suspended for forty days without pay, and AUSA James Goeke was suspended 
for fifteen days without pay.  Id.; see also Matthew Volkov, Ted Stevens Case Prosecutors Appeal 
Disciplinary Action, MAIN JUSTICE (June 27, 2012, 6:08 PM), http://www.main 
justice.com/2012/06/27/ted-stevens-case-prosecutors-appeal-disciplinary-action/ (reporting that 
AUSAs Bottini and Goeke appealed PMRU’s disciplinary action and sought review from the U.S. 
Merit System Protection Board). 
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with DOJ personnel investigating other DOJ personnel.  This provides anything 
but a reliable mechanism for scrutinizing prosecutorial misconduct. 
V.  INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT PRACTICES 
A.  Ineffectiveness of Reporting Requirements 
Conduct unreported is conduct left unremedied.  Even though trial courts, 
appellate courts, and defense attorneys are in the best position to recognize 
prosecutorial misconduct and are ethically obligated to report such misconduct, 
this rarely happens in practice.208  Current ethical guidelines obligate judges to 
report suspected misconduct.  The American Bar Association Standing 
Commission on Professional Discipline’s Judicial Response to Lawyer 
Misconduct instructs that “[o]nce a reviewing court has found a prosecutor’s 
actions to be misconduct in the form of a disciplinary rule violation, whether or 
not reversal or dismissal is warranted, the court should report the conduct to the 
appropriate disciplinary authorities.”209  Similarly, the Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct provides: 
A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood 
that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct . . . should take appropriate action.  A judge having 
knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct . . . that raises a substantial question as to the 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects shall inform the appropriate authority.210 
Other attorneys—particularly defense attorneys—are also in an optimal 
position to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct and are similarly obligated 
to report observed misconduct to the appropriate authority.211  The Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct require an attorney to report misconduct if he “knows 
that another lawyer has committed a violation . . . that raises a substantial 
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.”212  However, 
defense attorneys are typically reluctant to report prosecutorial misconduct.213 
 208. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128–29 
(2008) (“[J]udges [and legislators] have never answered the calls for external regulation of the 
prosecutor’s office, and the political dynamics of American criminal justice make it very unlikely 
that they will do so in the future.”). 
 209. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 436 & n.172 (quoting STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L 
DISCIPLINE, AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO LAWYER MISCONDUCT § I.12 (1984)). 
 210. Id. at 436 n.172 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(D)(2) (1990)). 
 211. Attorneys are obligated to report misconduct on the part of both other attorneys and 
judges.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a)–(b) (2013). 
 212. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a). 
 213. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 428–29, 433 (“[I]t is an empirical fact that very few defense 
attorneys report prosecutors who commit misconduct to the state bar or any other disciplinary 
authority.”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2009) (discussing a study of Boston 
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Criminal defendants also have the opportunity to report prosecutorial 
misconduct.  However, unlike the reports made by judges and defense attorneys, 
complaints made by defendants are generally unsuccessful because the 
defendant is seen as too self-interested or is unable to correctly distinguish 
between misconduct and zealous advocacy because of his inadequate knowledge 
of the criminal justice system. 214   Furthermore, most defendants are 
understandably too focused on their attorneys’ ability to protect their interests, 
leaving little room to worry about reporting possible prosecutorial 
misconduct.215 
Why the reticence by judges and defense counsel to report misconduct?  
Because prosecutors wield significant power and influence over local criminal 
justice communities, both judges and defense counsel are often concerned about 
the possible backlash that a report of misconduct might generate.216  In certain 
situations, prosecutors have the power to challenge a judge’s ability to sit on 
criminal cases, and, in some states, can even remove a judge from hearing any 
criminal cases. 217  Moreover, judges are often hesitant to sully prosecutors’ 
careers and reputations.218  Finally, it is commonly believed that judges can and 
should remediate problems in their courtrooms without resorting to outside 
authorities.219 
Defense attorneys are similarly vulnerable to the repercussions that may result 
from reporting prosecutorial misconduct.  A defense attorney who acquires a 
reputation for “turning in” local prosecutors may find himself ostracized or 
marginalized from the local criminal justice community. 220   This type of 
consequence may limit an attorney’s effectiveness in the plea negotiation 
process, which resolves ninety-five percent of cases.221  This negative impact 
upon an attorney’s ability to represent his clients successfully would, in turn, 
affect the attorney’s ability to obtain new clients. 
attorneys that found “that only 6.3% of lawyers would report their colleagues to the bar were they 
aware of a flagrant violation of an ethical canon, which, if discovered, might result in criminal 
liability”). 
 214. Steele, supra note 21, at 979–80. 
 215. Id. at 980. 
 216. See Gershowitz, supra note 213, at 1086 (arguing that the failure to report misconduct 
often results from ignorance of ethics rules, fear of retaliation or being considered a “snitch,” and 
the absence of meaningful sanctions for violating the rules). 
 217. See Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 
TEX. L. REV. 629, 693 (1972) (describing jurisdictions in which litigants can move to disqualify a 
judge for no specific reason, similar to a peremptory challenge in the jury-selection process). 
 218. Gershowitz, supra note 213, at 1086–87 (noting judges’ reluctance to report prosecutorial 
misconduct, which may stem in part from sympathy for the prosecutor and his career). 
 219. See Morton, supra note 14, at 1098. 
 220. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 425–26 (describing the difficulties a defense attorney might 
face if he develops a reputation for reporting misconduct). 
 221. Id. at 437. 
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Additionally, there also exists the belief that reporting prosecutorial 
misconduct is futile in the absence of a viable disciplinary body empowered to 
investigate or discipline the offenders.222  Indeed, no state has established an 
effective mechanism designed solely to investigate and discipline prosecutorial 
misconduct. 223   Given the inadequacies of current methodologies and the 
significant drawbacks to reporting, it comes as no surprise that those in a position 
to see so much report so little. 
B.  The Inadequacies of Trial Court and Appellate Court Remedies 
Although current attorney discipline practices are largely ineffective, there are 
instances in which prosecutorial misconduct is identified and remedied at the 
trial level.  For example, trial judges frequently resolve problems that arise from 
discovery-related misconduct. 224   Indeed, the trial court has the option to 
exclude evidence affected by misconduct, a remedy that is most appropriate in 
cases in which the prosecutor fails to provide discovery in a timely fashion.225  
Still, while the option of excluding evidence exists, most trial courts are reticent 
to employ such a measure.226  Out of concern for the government’s case, many 
judges simply continue the trial to give defense counsel adequate time to react 
to tardy disclosures.  Although this approach maintains the integrity of the state’s 
case, it typically will not result in the sanctioning of the offending prosecutor.227  
The trial judge may choose to give the offending prosecutor a verbal reprimand, 
but typically there are no further repercussions.228  There is, therefore, little 
incentive for offending prosecutors to refrain from future misconduct. 
 222. See id. at 437–38 (observing that the lack of real consequences for misconduct is a 
practical justification for failing to report misconduct). 
 223. See supra note 174 (describing two independent searches for jurisdictions that have 
established a body to investigate and discipline prosecutorial misconduct). 
 224. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (explaining that it is the 
responsibility of the trial court to rule on the admissibility of evidence). 
 225. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1967); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 265, 272 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31–32 (1957). 
 226. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 36–37.  Brady violations are the “most pernicious” 
form of misconduct because they prevent “the jury from considering proper and admissible 
evidence supporting the innocence of the defendant.”  Id. at 36. 
 227. See Smith v. Phillip, 455 U.S. 209, 220 (1982) (concluding that there was no proof of 
actual bias or prejudice to the defendant despite the existence of prosecutorial misconduct).  In 
Smith, Justice Rehnquist noted that overlooking the misconduct was appropriate because the 
“touchstone of due process analysis is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”  
Id. at 219. 
 228. See Morton, supra note 14, at 1102–03 (explaining that the harmless error doctrine 
ensures that the prosecutor will not be subject to suppression or exclusion because of his 
misconduct); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (admonishing the prosecutor 
but holding that the misconduct was harmless). 
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It must be acknowledged that prosecutorial misconduct rarely results in 
conviction reversals.229  Accepting the reality that successful appeals of criminal 
convictions, regardless of the issues, are unlikely, alleging prosecutorial 
misbehavior as the basis for reversal is a daunting task.230  The harmless error 
standard adds an additional hurdle by providing great leeway for appellate courts 
to uphold convictions, even in light of trial irregularities such as prosecutorial 
misconduct. 231   Appellate courts often recognize prosecutorial error, but 
invariably consider it inconsequential to the integrity of the ultimate verdict.232  
Consequently, even if the appellate opinion points out the prosecutor’s 
misconduct, the conviction may nonetheless stand.233  Generally, the prosecutor 
receives no greater punishment than the court’s rebuking remarks.234  Without 
meaningful adverse consequences for prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor 
has no incentive to comply with his professional obligations in the future. 
C.  The Ineffectiveness of Juror Admonitions 
Trial court judges may need to admonish juries to keep them focused on their 
duties and to remind them to consider only admissible evidence.235  However, 
the belief that “unringing a bell” can cure significant errors disregards the fact 
that admonitions, or “curative instructions,” are actually ineffective and may 
even aggravate the problems they intend to solve. 236   The purpose of an 
admonition is to diminish the prejudicial impact of improper evidence on jurors 
 229. Gershman, supra note 21, at 160 (citing the “small number” of cases that are reversed 
because of prosecutorial misconduct).  Indeed, the few cases that are reversed involve conduct 
egregious enough to surpass the harmless error standard.  See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 
U.S. 667, 679 (1985) (describing the difficult burden the defendant must overcome to achieve a 
reversal based on prosecutorial misconduct); People v. Steele, 65 N.Y.S.2d 214 (N.Y. Gen. Sess. 
1946) (ordering a new trial because, according to the judge: “A fraud has been perpetrated on the 
court, which requires me to act.  A prosecutor cannot be permitted to profit from his own 
concealment of the true facts, in derogation of the rights of the defendant.”). 
 230. Andrew Smith, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of 
Scrutiny, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1935, 1954–57 (2008) (acknowledging the difficulty of succeeding on 
a prosecutorial misconduct appeal). 
 231. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1967) (explaining that convictions need 
not be automatically overturned because of misconduct under the harmless error doctrine). 
 232. Id. at 22. 
 233. Id. at 21–22. 
 234. Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do With It?, 18 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 746–47 (2005) (discussing courts’ reluctance to publicly reprimand 
prosecutors for identified misconduct, despite having the power to do so); see also Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (emphasizing that the purpose for appellate review is not to punish the 
prosecutor, but to ensure that the defendant had a fair trial). 
 235. See FED. R. EVID. 105 (instructing the trial judge to give a limiting instruction if the 
evidence is admissible for one purpose, but not for another); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (instructing 
the trial judge to exclude evidence if it is unfairly prejudicial, might mislead the jury, or is a waste 
of time). 
 236. See Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 885–86 (5th Cir. 1962) (recognizing the 
inadequacies of curative instructions). 
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by instructing them to ignore the objectionable evidence or to limit its use during 
deliberations.  However, the bulk of research studies suggest that jurors 
frequently fail to comply with admonitions to disregard certain evidence entirely 
or to limit the application of evidence to specific issues.237  In fact, in many 
cases, admonitions actually increase the prejudicial impact of the presence or 
absence of evidence.238 
The manner in which an appellate court reviews prosecutorial error 
compounds this problem.239  Appellate judges typically consider a lower court’s 
admonition to the jury to disregard improperly presented evidence an effective 
remedy, and therefore have been historically disinclined to overturn a decision 
if the error was “cured” at trial.240  A prosecutor’s knowledge of this tendency 
to disregard misconduct is concerning because it may increase his likelihood to 
introduce improper evidence or testimony that the jury cannot disregard.  Yet, 
even though admonitions to disregard improper evidence may increase the 
prejudicial impact of evidence and raise the probability for conviction, defense 
attorneys must move for an admonition at trial in order to preserve the alleged 
error for appeal.241  The defense may be forced to choose between damaging the 
client’s chances of acquittal at trial and the possibility of waiving the right to 
appeal on the grounds of the perceived error.242  This systemic problem thus 
reduces the likelihood that prosecutorial errors and misconduct will be remedied 
at the trial level. 
 237. See, e.g., Dale Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 
753–54 (1959) (describing a study conducted to measure the effect of limiting instructions on 
juries); J. Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of 
Psychologist-Lawyer Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741, 750 (1988) (arguing that jurors have 
difficulty following instructions to disregard evidence). 
 238. J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 
86 (1990) (“If jurors are instructed to disregard incriminating evidence, they are more likely to find 
the defendant guilty; if instructed to disregard exculpatory evidence, they are more likely to 
acquit.”); J. Alexander Tanford, Thinking about Elephants: Admonitions, Empirical Research and 
Legal Policy, 60 UMKC L. REV. 645, 652 (1992) (arguing that limiting instructions are more 
harmful than helpful); see also Paul Bergman, Admonishing Jurors to Disregard What They 
Haven’t Heard, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 689, 691–92  (1992) (discussing the concern that juries will 
naturally make impermissible inferences without an instruction to the contrary). 
 239. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the 
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and 
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1000–02 (1985–1986) (describing the standards by 
which appellate courts review error). 
 240. Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, supra note 238, at 99–100. 
 241. FED. R. EVID. 103 (permitting a party to appeal an error at trial only if he makes a timely 
objection).  Under the procedural default doctrine, appellate courts do not usually evaluate an issue 
unless it was first raised to the trial court.  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 733–34 (1991).  
If a party does not object and request an admonishment at trial, the appellant waives the right to 
appeal on that issue.  Id. 
 242. Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, supra note 238, at 99–100. 
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D.  The Unintended Consequence of the Harmless Error Doctrine 
As noted earlier, another obstacle to curbing prosecutorial misconduct is the 
harmless error doctrine, which effectively condones misconduct.243  Given the 
vast deference that appellate courts grant to trial courts and their verdicts, the 
harmless error doctrine treats most prosecutorial trial errors as irrelevant.244  
Even if the appellate court clearly identifies misconduct, it will only overturn a 
conviction if the prosecutor’s behavior was harmful error, or error that “affect[s] 
the substantial rights of the parties.” 245   The purpose of the harmless error 
doctrine is to improve efficiency by preventing multiple trials to address minor 
errors.246  For example, one study involving 2,131 California appellate cases 
alleging prosecutorial misconduct found misconduct in 444 cases, or twenty-one 
percent.247  Of these 444 cases, the courts overturned the convictions in fifty-
four. 248  The courts affirmed the convictions in the other 390 cases, reasoning 
that the misconduct was harmless.249 
To overcome the harmless error standard in the context of an alleged Brady 
violation, the defendant must establish that “there is a reasonable probability 
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”250  More specifically, an appellate court will not 
overturn a conviction in cases in which the prosecutor fails to disclose 
exculpatory or impeaching evidence unless the court finds that the undisclosed 
evidence was “material,” or so important that it “undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.”251  Although it is common sense that a verdict should not 
be overturned unless the error made a difference to the decision, it is also 
important to recognize that prosecutors who engage in “harmless” error are not 
subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny and can continue to commit misconduct 
with impunity. 
E.  The Unintended Consequence of the Plain Error Rule 
Much like the harmless error doctrine, the plain error rule unintentionally 
ignores, and thus implicitly condones, prosecutorial misconduct.252  Because 
defense counsel’s failure to object to misconduct at trial typically waives the 
 243. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967). 
 244. Id. at 22. 
 245. 18 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006) (instructing federal appellate courts to review “the record without 
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties”). 
 246. Preventable Error, supra note 1, at 19. 
 247. CAL. FINAL REPORT, supra note 126, at 71. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
 251. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. 
 252. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered 
even though it was not brought to the court’s attention”); Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability 
and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 124 (1998). 
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right to appeal unless the error is clear, appellate courts often overlook 
prosecutorial misconduct.253  For instance, in cases involving Brady violations, 
courts generally review findings of fact for clear error.254  If the objection is 
timely, the court will review the misconduct to determine whether the prosecutor 
violated a rule of trial practice and whether that violation prejudiced the jury.255  
However, if defense counsel does not object at trial, appellate courts use the 
much more deferential plain error standard.256 
F.  Immunity From Civil Liability 
The law entitles prosecutors to absolute immunity for actions taken within the 
course and scope of their duties.257  The breadth of prosecutorial immunity 
suggests to prosecutors that they may act without fear of sanction for 
misconduct.258  While prosecutors may be disciplined or even disbarred for their 
misconduct, they are virtually free from civil liability. 259   Even exonerated 
individuals will rarely prevail against the prosecutors who wrongfully convicted 
them, and only in situations in which the prosecutor acted outside the scope of 
his position.260 
Most recently, in Connick v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 does not impose liability on prosecutors for a single Brady 
violation.261  As a result, exonerated individuals now find it more difficult to 
obtain redress for their loss of liberty.  In Connick, prosecutors conceded shortly 
before Thompson’s execution date that they had violated Brady by failing to 
disclose a crime lab report that Thompson’s attorneys had discovered. 262  
Thompson was acquitted after a second trial, and he subsequently sued the 
prosecutor’s office, alleging a Brady violation based on the office’s failure to 
provide adequate training for its prosecutors to comply with Brady and other 
constitutional requirements.263  The Court ruled in favor of the prosecutor’s 
 253. See FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring a timely objection at trial to argue an error on appeal). 
 254. Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 255. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 415 n.90; Gershman, supra note 252, at 124. 
 256. Bazelon, supra note 36, at 423–24; see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163  
& n.14 (1982) (noting that the plain error standard is used only in exceptional circumstances and 
only if the error is extremely obvious). 
 257. Rosen, supra note 13, at 731–32. 
 258. Preventable Error, supra note 1, at 75 (“Absolute immunity allows prosecutors to commit 
misconduct with impunity, knowing that they are immune from any consequences, even if they act 
intentionally, in bad faith, or with malice.”). 
 259. Id. at 74 (explaining that prosecutors cannot be sued personally for actions taken within 
the scope of their duties). 
 260. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (discussing liability for non-prosecutorial 
conduct); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 1, at 66. 
 261. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356; see also Monell v. New York City Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92  (1978) (discussing § 1983 liability more generally). 
 262. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356–57. 
 263. Editorial, Justice and Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A26. 
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office, justifying its holding by relying on the fact that prosecutors can be 
punished for ethical violations with professional discipline, including sanctions, 
suspension, and disbarment.”264  One commentator noted that this ruling gives 
prosecutors “nearly absolute immunity against civil suits.” 265   Indeed, after 
Connick, a plaintiff who seeks relief under § 1983 must prove that “action 
pursuant to official municipal policy caused their injury.”266 
Official municipal policies require training programs for inexperienced 
prosecutors.  To impose liability, failure to educate certain employees about their 
legal duties must amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with 
whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.”267  Deliberate indifference 
requires policymakers to disregard the “known or obvious consequence[s]” of 
the deficiencies of their training programs, thereby leading employees to violate 
citizens’ constitutional rights.268  A pattern of similar constitutional violations 
by untrained employees is “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate 
indifference.269 
In Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court hypothesized a “single-incident” 
liability, meaning that an “obvious” Brady violation can substitute for the pattern 
of violations “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference.270  
In Connick, the Court found that the failure to train prosecutors regarding Brady 
issues does not fall within the narrow range of “single-incident” liability because 
attorneys receive unique training in legal writing before entering the profession, 
must satisfy CLE requirements, often receive on-the-job training from more 
experienced attorneys, and have ethical obligations to understand the 
requirements Brady imposes and to perform legal research if they are uncertain 
about a matter.271 
VI.  PREVIOUS PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
This Article is not the first (and certainly not the last) to propose a solution to 
the ongoing problem of prosecutorial misconduct.  In particular, four previous 
articles have identified such misconduct and have set forth thoughtful proposals.  
This Article builds on the solid foundations offered by this previous scholarship. 
Professor Richard Rosen proposes greater disciplinary sanctions to remedy 
rampant Brady violations. He acknowledges that, in one way or another, all fifty 
states have adopted a version of the ABA Model Rules to govern the conduct of 
 264. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 1354; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 
 267. Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 
 268. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410–11 (1997) 
(discussing the standard for liability for civil suits against city officials). 
 269. Id. at 409. 
 270. Id. at 399–400. 
 271. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361–62. 
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attorneys.272  Rosen maintains that, although the Rules should deter prosecutors 
from acting in bad faith, the reality is that bar disciplinary bodies simply do not 
adequately fulfill their duties, rendering the Rules largely ineffective.273 
Rosen suggests three ways to correct this problem: (1) granting state bars the 
authority to review cases for misconduct and to initiate disciplinary proceedings, 
independent of individually filed complaints;274 (2) imposing harsher penalties 
for Brady-type misconduct;275 and (3) reversing convictions based on bad-faith 
misconduct.276  Rosen argues that the suggested bad-faith standard is easily 
based on the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule, arguing that, if the 
exclusionary rule can punish police officers, it can also punish prosecutors.277 
Joseph Weeks, another author who has proposed methods of regulating the 
conduct of prosecutors, would hold prosecutors personally liable for damages 
sustained by the defendant if there is evidence of wrongful imprisonment.278  
Weeks argues that an extreme form of liability is necessary because there is 
currently no mechanism to prevent prosecutors from withholding exculpatory 
evidence other than the remote possibility that the conviction may be 
overturned.279  Weeks dismisses civil suits as an effective form of deterrence 
because of the qualified immunity that protects public officials for unintentional 
constitutional violations.280 
Through a fifty-state survey, Weeks demonstrates that criminal defendants 
have little to gain by seeking bar association review of a prosecutor’s 
misconduct.281  His survey establishes an utter lack of prosecutorial guidelines.  
Of nine cases involving Brady violations, courts imposed no punishment in three 
cases, imposed minor sanctions in four cases, suspended the prosecutor in one 
case, and removed the prosecutor from office in the final case.282  Similarly, the 
 272. Rosen, supra note 13, at 733, 735–36. 
 273. Id. at 731–32 (“Effectively insulated from disciplinary punishment and immune from civil 
suit, a prosecutor contemplating Brady-type misconduct knows that the only possible legal 
consequence of presenting false evidence or suppressing exculpatory evidence is that the defendant 
may be fortunate enough to discover the evidence and file for post-conviction relief.”). 
 274. Id. at 697.  Rosen posits that this mechanism is necessary because actually calling 
prosecutors before the disciplinary body for review is very difficult.  Id. at 733. 
 275. Id. at 697.  Rosen claims that the reluctance of the review boards and courts to impose 
strong sanctions in cases in which an individual alleges misconduct is evidence enough that 
change is necessary.  Id. at 733. 
 276. Id. at 697.  Courts should reverse convictions if the prosecutor intentionally suppressed 
exculpatory evidence or presented false evidence.  Id. at 739. 
 277. Id. at 737.  The court first invoked the exclusionary rule as a remedy for 4th 
Amendment violations.  Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 278. Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty 
of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 928 (1997). 
 279. Id. at 931. 
 280. Id. at 871. 
 281. Id. at 898 (noting that criminal defendants generally seek only two remedies: reversal or 
a reduction in sentence). 
 282. Id. at 881.  
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state bar association had never filed a formal Brady complaint in thirty-five of 
the forty-one states that participated in the study.283  As a result of this lack of 
accountability, Weeks suggest that defendants should be permitted to sue 
prosecutors directly, and that the state subsequently indemnify the prosecutor 
for any damages incurred.284  He argues that this will allow the defendant to 
receive compensatory damages proportionate to the sentence imposed by his 
conviction.285  While this proposal provides monetary relief to the defendant, a 
disciplinary scheme that imposes bar sanctions on prosecutors found personally 
liable for misconduct is still necessary. 
Peter A. Joy suggests that prosecutorial misconduct largely results from three 
institutional conditions: (1) vague ethics rules; (2) vast discretionary authority 
with little to no transparency; and (3) inadequate remedies for prosecutorial 
misconduct, which create perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather 
than refrain from, prosecutorial misconduct.286  Joy argues for the adoption of 
the ABA Prosecution Function Standards, which “provide examples of the types 
of norms that should be considered in clearly defining the prosecutor’s ethical 
duties.”287  The Standards require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence 
to a grand jury, ensure that there is sufficient admissible evidence before filing 
charges, and disclose Brady material in a timely manner.288  Conversely, the 
Standards prohibit prosecutors from cross-examining truthful witnesses to 
discredit or undermine their testimony, asking questions that imply the existence 
of a fact in which the prosecutor does not have a good faith belief; and making 
arguments to the jury that would divert them from deciding the case on the 
evidence.289 
Although greater specificity regarding prosecutorial misconduct would 
provide better guidance, the provisions set forth in the Standards are well known 
to the criminal justice community.290  Even though some ambiguity regarding 
Brady disclosures persists, the core of the Brady disclosure requirements is well 
established.291 
Joy’s second recommendation is to provide more transparent oversight of 
prosecutors’ exercise of their vast discretionary power.292  Drawing once more 
from the proposed Standards, Joy suggests the drafting of a “prosecutor’s 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 929. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400–01 (2006). 
 287. Id. at 418. 
 288. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION § 3-3 (1993). 
 289. Id. at § 3-5. 
 290. Joy, supra note 286, at 401. 
 291. Id. at 412. 
 292. Id. at 420–21. 
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handbook” to provide greater clarity and transparency.293  Based on the version 
of the Standards in effect at the time of Joy’s article, such a policy manual would 
be publicly accessible.294  Joy argues that a clear policy manual would facilitate 
internal discipline, which would be a significant step in adequately punishing 
prosecutorial misconduct.295 
Joy’s final recommendation suggests a more proactive approach, which would 
require prosecutors’ offices 
to implement a system of graduated discipline each time there is a 
finding by a trial judge or appellate court of prosecutorial misconduct.  
Bar disciplinary authorities should implement a system to review 
reported instances of prosecutorial misconduct and, when they deem 
it appropriate, conduct investigations or recommend discipline.296 
Joy’s proposal for greater transparency and clearer guidelines is essential to 
any proposal to address prosecutorial misconduct.  As Joy argues, a more 
proactive approach that imposes tighter controls on prosecutors should be 
undertaken. 
Finally, Ellen Yaroshefsky proposes improved internal practices and policies 
in prosecutors’ offices, such as “clear, written disclosure standards” and 
“effective hiring, training, supervising, and monitoring” of prosecutors. 297  
Additionally, Yaroshefsky highlights the problems that arise from a prosecutor’s 
evaluation of possible Brady information, his determination of the information’s 
materiality, and his decision of whether to disclose it.298  Yaroshefsky warns 
that, because of “[c]ognitive biases such as tunnel vision and confirmation bias,” 
a prosecutor’s belief in a defendant’s guilt is likely to impair his judgment 
regarding the information’s materiality.299  Materiality, therefore, should not 
play a role in the pretrial assessment of which information should be disclosed.  
Instead, prosecutors should err on the side of too much disclosure. 300  
Yaroshefsky further suggests the creation of a Conviction Integrity Unit within 
the district attorney’s office that would audit cases resulting in wrongful 
 293. Id. at 421 (proposing a handbook that contains a “statement of (i) general policies to guide 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and (ii) procedures of the office”). 
 294. Id. at 422 (quoting NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS  
§ 10.3 (1991)) (recommending that the policy manual “should be subject to access by the general 
public and/or law enforcement agencies or the defense bar”). 
 295. Id. at 424. 
 296. Id. at 427. 
 297. Ellen Yaroshefsky, New Orleans Prosecutorial Disclosure in Practice After Connick v. 
Thompson, 15 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 913, 936 (2012).  Although Yaroshefsky focuses on the issues 
specifically affecting Orleans Parish in Louisiana, her suggestions for reform are more widely and 
generally applicable. 
 298. Id. at 936–37. 
 299. Id. at 937. 
 300. Id. at 937–38. 
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convictions to identify errors and subsequently institute new procedures to 
prevent similar future wrongful convictions.301 
Yaroshefsky also advocates for open file discovery, which “requires the 
prosecutor to provide the complete investigative files, including any material 
obtained by law enforcement, to the defense before trial including investigators’ 
notes, the required recordation of all oral statements, and any other information 
obtained during the investigation.”302 
Lastly, Yaroshefsky urges for the implementation of a system of external 
accountability, which would require greater and more effective supervision and 
discipline by the state bar association and the state supreme court.303  She further 
calls on judges to take a more active role in the supervision of disclosure 
practices by conducting a pretrial conference to ensure that the parties 
understand and have fulfilled the disclosure and ethical obligations.304 
In addition to Rosen, Weeks, Joy, and Yaroshefsky, a number of other 
commentators have suggested various other approaches to address prosecutorial 
misconduct.305  Specifically, several commentators have proposed some form of 
commission dedicated solely to the oversight of prosecutors.306 
VII.  THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION MODEL 
The various schemes designed to deal with prosecutorial misconduct and the 
various proposals advanced by academics over the years, coupled with the 
reality that prosecutorial misconduct is rarely reported, raise serious questions 
as to whether any scheme can be effective.  Compounding this problem is the 
fact that, even if prosecutorial misconduct is reported, there is no viable body to 
investigate or discipline the guilty party.  Nevertheless, the regulatory schemes 
currently in place to investigate and discipline judges may serve as helpful 
 301. Id. at 938. 
 302. Id. at 939; Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform after Connick and 
Garcetti, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1329, 1371–72 (2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged the benefits of open file discovery).  Ohio and North Carolina already implement 
this method.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2011). 
 303. Yaroshefsky, supra note 297, at 940–41. 
 304. Id. at 940. 
 305. See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 21, at 453–55.  Gershman builds on Steele’s proposal of 
a committee modeling the Texas Statute for prosecutor misconduct commissions.  Id. at 354.  He 
suggests that prosecutors’ distinct role, as well as their ability to exercise a “quasi-judicial” 
function, requires a commission to monitor their conduct and ensure that they fulfill their ethical 
duties.  Id.  He proposes modeling these commissions on the already existing independent judicial 
committees.  Id.  Another commentator recommends implementing a similar mechanism.  Minsker, 
supra note 21.  Another commentator recognizes the need for an independent prosecutorial 
commission (IPC), and expands on Gershman’s proposal by suggesting that such a committee 
regulate, discipline, and disclose the prosecutors’ names, the outcome of an investigation, and the 
discipline that was imposed.  Morey, supra note 21, at 636, 639. 
 306. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 21 at 982 (proposing that every state follow the Texas model 
of a commission solely dedicated to the policing and sanctioning of prosecutors). 
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models for future regulation of prosecutors.307  All fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government maintain judicial conduct commissions 
to protect and foster confidence in the criminal justice system.308 
To effectively fulfill their duties, judges, like prosecutors, must be free to 
operate with autonomy within the bounds of their ethical and professional 
duties.309  Any concern that an independent body monitoring the actions of the 
court may affect judges’ independent authority has largely been laid to rest.310  
Given the similarly sensitive positions of both judges and prosecutors, the 
judicial commission model as a matrix for prosecutorial commissions may 
present a viable solution. 
In 1960, California became the first jurisdiction to establish a judicial conduct 
commission. 311   The commission was part of a package of judicial 
administration reform legislation intended to provide “real protection against 
incompetency, misconduct or non-performance of duty” from judicial 
officials.312  The purpose of the commission was not to sanction judges, but to 
protect the public.313  The authority of the commission was limited to protecting 
the independence of the judiciary so that judges would remain free to make 
unpopular decisions without fear of discipline.314  By 1981, every state and the 
District of Columbia followed California’s example and established their own 
 307. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Judges Judging Judges: The Federal Judicial 
Misconduct Statutes and the Breyer Committee Report, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 426 (2007) (discussing the 
procedure judges follow if they are accused of misconduct). 
 308. Cynthia Gray, How Judicial Conduct Commissions Work, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 405, 405 
(2007). 
 309. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial 
Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 121 (2008) 
(describing the importance of judicial autonomy). 
 310. See Sambhav N. Sankar, Disciplining the Professional Judge, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1239 
(2000) (noting the general acceptance of independent oversight of judicial conduct, especially in 
state courts). 
 311. Jonathan Abel, Testing Three Commonsense Intuitions About Judicial Conduct 
Commissions, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2012).  California voters approved the commission 
and  voted for it by a margin of three to one.  Id. at 1029. 
 312. Meeting Agenda, CAL. ASSEMBLY BUDGET SUBCOMM. NO. 4, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2004). 
 313. Gray, supra note 308, at 405. 
 314. Id. at 408 (“The power of conduct commissions is limited to protect the independence of 
the judiciary; a judge must feel free to make a decision that may provoke complaints without fearing 
that he or she will be disciplined by the commission.”). 
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judicial conduct commissions.315  Similarly, in 1980, the federal government 
established its own commission.316 
Judicial conduct commissions are similar in structure.  Each is a state 
administrative agency that receives complaints made by private citizens, 
investigates alleged misconduct, and submits cases of misconduct for 
adjudication within the commission.317  However, judicial conduct commissions 
differ in two significant ways: the range of sanctions available to the 
commission, and whether the commission has final authority on sanctions.318  
Every state allows its commission to remove a judge for severe or willful 
misconduct.319  Additionally, most commissions employ a range of less severe 
sanctions, including suspension, public censure, and a wide variety of private 
disciplinary measures.320  However, California is the only jurisdiction in which 
the judicial commission has the authority to remove a judge from office on its 
own initiative.321  While other state commissions can remove judges from office, 
the state supreme court must approve any censure or removal action.322 
 315. Id. at 406 (noting that twenty-eight states established commissions by provisions in their 
constitutions, sixteen states established commissions by statute, and seven established commissions 
by court rule).  The number of members of a judicial conduct commission varies by state.  Id.  At 
one extreme, Ohio’s commission has twenty-eight members.  Id.  At the other, Montana’s 
commission is comprised of only five members.  Id.  The commissions often include judges, 
attorneys, and private citizens.  Id. (noting that a majority of commissioners California, Hawaii, 
Iowa, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin are laypersons).  In 
some states, judges are appointed to the board, based on the court in which they sit.  Id.  For 
example, the Arizona Constitution requires that the commission include two appellate court judges, 
one justice of the peace, one municipal court judge, two attorneys, and three private citizens.  Id. 
 316. Judicial Code and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2006). 
 317. Abel, supra note 311, at 1029.  In Texas, for example, the commission consists of thirteen 
members, six judges appointed by the Texas Supreme Court, five citizen members appointed by 
the governor, and two attorneys appointed by the bar.  STATE COMM’N ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 
SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION STAFF REPORT 10 (2012) [hereinafter SUNSET ADVISORY 
COMMISSION], available at http://www.scjc.state.tx.us/pdf/FinalSunsetStaffReport.pdf.  The 
commission members serve six-year staggered terms and meet six times a year.  Id. 
 318. Abel, supra note 311, at 1029–30. 
 319. Id. at 1030–31. 
 320. Gray, supra note 308, at 406 (“A judge commits willful misconduct if the judge violates 
the code of judicial conduct while acting in a judicial capacity and with malice or in bad faith.”). 
 321. Abel, supra note 311, at 1029–30. 
 322. SUNSET ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 317, at 5.  The Texas Sunset Advisory 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, in its 2012 annual report, was critical of the limited range of 
penalties available to judicial commissions following formal proceedings.  The Advisory 
Commission maintained that such limitations deter the judicial commission from pursuing cases of 
public import in open proceedings.  Id.  The Advisory Commission further maintained that 
confidence in the judiciary rests on high-profile cases being heard openly.  Id.  The Texas advisory 
commissioners maintain that granting greater authority to sanction and opening hearings to the 
public would help alleviate two of the problems most judicial commissions struggle to address: 
public confidence in the court system through a balance of judicial independence and accountability 
and transparency in proceedings.  Id. 
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There is also some variation in a commission’s authority to impose sanctions 
on a judge once he has retired or otherwise left office.  In some jurisdictions, the 
commission loses jurisdiction and the proceedings are considered moot. 323  
However, most states allow commissions to impose sanctions even after a judge 
has left the bench.324 
A.  Triggering an Inquiry 
Complaints against judges, which must be filed with the proper court office, 
can be filed by anyone.325  There are few restrictions.326  Any person can write 
a complaint letter to the commission,327 and, in some states, complete a form 
available online.328  Generally, a complaint letter must include the name of the 
judge or official, the name of the court on which the judge sits, a detailed 
explanation of alleged misconduct, the names and contact information of any 
witnesses, the date(s) of the alleged misconduct, the type of case in which the 
misconduct occurred, and the complainant’s relationship to the case.329 
B.  An Initial Screening 
Upon receipt of a complaint, a commission conducts an initial screening to 
determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant an investigation.330  In 
preparation for this initial screening, a commission’s legal staff is responsible 
for evaluating the complaint, researching relevant legal issues, and seeking any 
additional necessary information.331  However, the legal staff does not conduct 
the investigation or contact the judge or court personnel.  Rather, the commission 
reviews the complaint and the staff’s evaluation, and then decides whether to 
dismiss the complaint or to authorize its staff to conduct a further inquiry.332  
 323. Gray, supra note 308, at 409. 
 324. Id.  One policy reason in support of sanctions following a judge after they have left the 
bench is the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, because the alternative, silence, 
may be observed by the public as overlooking the wrongdoing, or, worse yet, condoning it.  Id. 
 325. 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2006). 
 326. Id. (detailing the procedure to address possible misconduct); see also Helman, supra note 
307, at 427.  The process begins with the filing of a complaint about a judge with the clerk of the 
appropriate court (the court of appeals for that circuit).  28 U.S.C. § 351. 
 327. 28 U.S.C. § 3651(a). 
 328. How to File a Complaint, STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 
http://cjp.ca.gov/file_a_complaint.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (providing a link for a printable 
form). 
 329. Id. 
 330. Hellman, supra note 307, at 428 (describing the procedure one must follow to file a 
complaint against a judge). 
 331. The Complaint Process, STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 
http://cjp.ca.gov/complaint_process.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
 332. See, e.g., id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2006).  Cases filed by prisoners and litigants 
against judges are historically dismissed ninety-seven to ninety-eight percent of the time, whereas 
those filed by attorneys, court personnel or public officials are dismissed only thirty-seven percent 
of the time.  Lara A. Bazelon, Putting Mice the in Charge of the Cheese: Why Federal Judges 
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Following a further inquiry, the commission can close or dismiss the complaint, 
issue an advisory letter, or commence a preliminary investigation.333  In most 
jurisdictions, the commission will not notify the judge of a pending complaint 
until it has authorized a preliminary investigation.334 
C.  The Investigative Stage 
During the investigation phase, a commission may contact witnesses, review 
court records and other documents, observe court proceedings, or oversee any 
other appropriate means of investigation.335  After the initial investigation, the 
commission typically asks the judge to respond to the allegations of misconduct, 
after which it may decide to dismiss the complaint. 336   If dismissal is not 
warranted, the commission may issue notice of its intent to privately admonish 
the judge, issue notice of its intent to publicly admonish the judge, or institute 
formal proceedings against the judge.337  If the commission chooses to admonish 
the judge, the judge has the right to contest the admonishment before the 
commission or to request a formal hearing. 338   If the judge demands an 
appearance before the commission, it will review the record, consider the 
judge’s arguments, and determine whether to close the complaint, issue an 
advisory letter,339 or go forward with a private340 or public341 admonishment.  
Cannot Always Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 KY. L.J. 
439, 468–69 (2009). 
 333. See The Complaint Process, supra note 331. 
 334. See, e.g., How to File a Complaint, supra note 328. 
 335. See STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2 
(2011) [hereinafter CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs 
/annual_reports/2011_%20Annual_Report_03-29-12(1).puff. 
 336. See, e.g., id. 
 337. See, e.g., id. at 2. 
 338. See, e.g., id. at 3–5. 
 339. See, e.g., id. at 5.  An advisory letter is a sanction available only after an investigation, 
following a staff inquiry or a preliminary investigation has been conducted and the opportunity of 
the judge to respond to the allegations.  Id.  Such sanction is proper when the commission 
determines that the judicial officer acted inappropriately but the misconduct was relatively minor.  
Id.  This confidential letter advises the judge to use caution or expresses disapproval of the judge’s 
conduct.  Id. 
 340. Id.  More serious misconduct may warrant a private admonishment.  Id.  The commission 
sends confidential notice to the judge describing the improper conduct and the conclusions reached 
by the commission.  Id.  The commission advises the complainant that it has taken corrective action, 
but it does not disclose specific details.  Id.  Pursuant to the California Constitution, the governor 
of any state, the president of the United States, or the Commission on Judicial Appointment may 
request the private admonishment or advisory letter for a judge who is under consideration for 
judicial appointment.  Id. 
 341. See, e.g., id.  When misconduct warrants a more severe sanction than private discipline, 
including public admonishment or public censure, the commission notifies the judge and makes the 
sanction available to the complainant, the press, and the general public.  Id.  A public censure is 
appropriate after a hearing or without a hearing if the judge consents.  Id.  In cases involving 
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These options protect the judge from a formal proceeding; the commission 
conducts a hearing only if the judge requests it or, following a preliminary 
investigation, a hearing is necessary.342 
D.  The Hearing 
Hearings are typically conducted before special masters appointed by the 
highest court in the jurisdiction. 343   At the hearing, the judge or justice is 
afforded counsel and, in most jurisdictions, the right to confront the individual 
or individuals who filed the complaint.344  However, the complainant does not 
have the right to appear, and the extent to which he is involved in the proceedings 
is at the discretion of the special master.345  The commission will only give the 
complainant the opportunity to testify if he has additional relevant evidence 
beyond what already exists. 346   Typically, the evidence must establish 
misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.347  After the hearing, the special 
master reports his conclusion and recommendations to the commission.348 
E.  The Sanctions 
A commission, in considering the special master’s findings, can recommend 
to the jurisdiction’s highest court that the judge be removed from office.349  The 
commission can also impose a less serious punishment, including an advisory 
letter, public or private admonishment, or suspension with or without pay.350  A 
commission will typically only remove a judge from office if his “conduct is 
fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office.”351  In 
deciding what sanctions to apply, most states use the factors developed by the 
Washington Supreme Court in In re Deming: 
particularly severe misconduct, the commission may prevent the judge from taking further state 
court assignment.  Id.  The most serious sanction is removal, which requires a hearing.  Id. 
 342. See, e.g., id. at 5. 
 343. See, e.g., id. 
 344. 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(2) (2006). 
 345. 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(3) (2006). 
 346. 28 U.S.C. § 358(b)(3) (stating that the complainant may be permitted to appear at hearings 
under certain circumstances). 
 347. 28 U.S.C. § 362 (2006); see Gray, supra note 308, at 413 (“In thirty-four states, if the 
commission finds probable cause to believe that a judge has committed misconduct justifying a 
formal disciplinary proceeding, confidentiality ceases, and the formal charges, the judges answer, 
and subsequent proceedings, including the hearing and the commission’s decision, are public.”). 
 348. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 16. 
As part of its determination, the special master, in addition to determining whether the complaint 
has merit, will determine whether the violation constituted “willful misconduct.”  28 U.S.C. § 354 
(2006). 
 349. Id. 
 350. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 2. 
 351. James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of Misconduct, 30 NOVA L. REV. 
349, 357 (2006) (noting that removal is only considered in especially egregious circumstances). 
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(a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or evidenced a 
pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and frequency of occurrence 
of the acts of misconduct; (c) whether the misconduct occurred in or 
out of the courtroom; (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the 
judge’s official capacity or in his private life; (e) whether the judge 
has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f) whether the 
judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his conduct; (g) the 
length of service on the bench; (h) whether there have been prior 
complaints about this judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the 
integrity of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to which 
the judge exploited his position to satisfy his personal desires.352 
The judge has the right appeal the punishment to the jurisdiction’s highest 
court.353 
VIII.  A NEW PROPOSAL: INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS FOR PROSECUTORIAL 
OVERSIGHT 
There are a number of ways to remedy the problems with the current 
disciplinary systems for prosecutorial misconduct.  Clearer guidelines 
establishing prosecutors’ duties and obligations would be beneficial. 354  
Unfortunately, because much of the misconduct is of a knowing and deliberate 
nature, clearly defined parameters would most likely prove inconsequential.  
Some scholars suggest tightening internal security within prosecutors’ offices as 
a corrective measure. 355   However, internal discipline has also proven 
ineffective.356  One commentator proposes denying immunity to prosecutors 
who engage in unethical, deliberate and knowing conduct.357  While the policy 
goals underlying prosecutorial immunity are no longer compelling, modifying 
the doctrine presents severe challenges.  A more realistic approach is to reduce 
the standard for reversal from harmless error to reasonable possibility, which 
would motivate prosecutors to fulfill their ethical obligations to ensure that 
appellate courts will uphold the convictions they secure on appeal.358 
However, these “remedies” remain at the periphery of the real concern.  There 
must be measured and proportionate consequences for behavior that falls below 
the high standards that prosecutors are expected to meet.  The cost of misconduct 
 352. 736 P.2d 639, 659 (1987).  When considering what sanctions to apply, the Florida courts, 
as well as the state commission, evaluate factors beyond the misconduct itself, such as past 
behavior, judicial experience, extenuating circumstances, pattern of behavior, motive, 
remorsefulness, repentance, rehabilitation effort in an individual case, and the judge’s candor or 
lack thereof.  Wolf, supra note 351, at 355–56. 
 353. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 2. 
 354. Yaroshefsky, supra note 297, at 936–37. 
 355. Id. at 936. 
 356. See id. at 935–36. 
 357. Weeks, supra note 278, at 836. 
 358. Id. at 839–840. 
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is too great to both the integrity of the criminal justice system and to the 
individuals who suffer because of a prosecutor’s misdeeds.  Although some 
scholars have offered their proposals for some manner of state prosecutorial 
commissions, this Article proposes a specific plan for such commissions.  A 
prosecutorial oversight commission should be designed to induce reporting of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct, while at the same time preserving prosecutors’ 
independence, autonomy, and discretionary authority.  State-authorized 
prosecutorial commissions can accomplish for prosecutorial integrity and 
accountability what judicial commissions have accomplished for judicial 
integrity and accountability.  This calls for a tiered response to all allegations of 
misconduct.  A diverse make-up of commission members and enhanced 
reporting requirements would foster a transparent process that recognizes the 
need for prosecutorial independence, as well as investigative and adjudicatory 
procedures to ensure due process. 
A.  A Tiered Response 
All initial claims of misconduct will be reviewed by a three-member screening 
committee, comprised of a retired judge, a retired criminal trial lawyer, and a 
layperson.  The governor or the chief justice of the state’s highest court will 
appoint all members of the committee.  Most claims of prosecutorial error will 
likely be dismissed, just as most claims presented to judicial commissions are 
dismissed at the analogous phase.359  However, should two of the three members 
believe by, a preponderance of the evidence, that error occurred, the committee 
would send the matter to the full commission for investigation, hearing, and, if 
necessary, determination of sanctions. 
A special prosecutor will be appointed to investigate, and ultimately to 
prosecute, the claim before the full commission.  The prosecutor accused of 
misconduct will have the right to counsel, whether retained or appointed.  A  
two-thirds majority of the full commission will evaluate the claim using a clear 
and convincing standard.  The commission will then make the following 
findings: whether misconduct occurred; second, whether the error was deliberate 
or inadvertent; and third, whether a reasonable probability exists that the error 
affected the criminal case.  Requiring these separate findings allows the 
commission to recognize different levels of severity of the prosecutor’s conduct, 
which the commission will take into account when determining the sanctions 
that will follow a finding of misconduct.  Just as deliberate misconduct will draw 
harsher sanctions than inadvertent misconduct, misconduct that had a reasonable 
probability of affecting the jury will be considered a more significant error and 
will also draw harsher sanctions.  The range of options available to the 
commission following a finding of misconduct should include public reprimand, 
fines, suspension, and disbarment. 
 359. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 12, at 717 & n. 129 (citing the rate of dismissal in California). 
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B.  A Diverse Commission 
Commission membership should be evenly divided between experts in the 
field of criminal justice and laypersons.  The experts—retired judges, former 
prosecutors, and seasoned defense attorneys—will be familiar with the 
requirements and practicalities of the prosecutorial function, and will thus be 
able to provide guidance for the laypersons.  The inclusion of laypersons will 
lend credibility to the commissions’ actions, partly by alleviating concerns that 
the experts are protecting their peers from the consequences of misconduct. 
C.  Enhanced Reporting 
After states established judicial conduct commissions, complaints against 
judges increased significantly.360  The reason for the increase in reporting is 
subject to different interpretations, but the creation of bodies specifically 
designed to address judicial misconduct must have had some bearing on the 
surge of complaints.  Likewise, a body specifically tasked with the investigation 
of prosecutors is likely to motivate private citizens, as well as other lawyers and 
judges, to more readily report misconduct.361  While state bar organizations have 
historically devoted little attention or effort to investigating—let alone 
disciplining—prosecutors, a prosecutorial commission would focus their 
energies exclusively on prosecutor misconduct. 
Additionally, appellate review of all cases citing prosecutorial error would 
further encourage the reporting of prosecutorial.  Under this proposal, an 
appellate court opinion citing prosecutorial misconduct will automatically come 
before the commission for review, regardless of the court’s holding. 
Consequently, the harmless error or plain error doctrines will not preclude 
review of the misconduct. 
 360. The Complaint Process, supra note 331.  Before 1995, the Commission was only 
authorized to make recommendations to the California Supreme Court, which had the authority to 
discipline a judge for misconduct.  Public Discipline & Decisions 1961–Present, STATE OF CAL. 
COMM’N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/pub_discipline_and_decisions.htm 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2014).  Between 1961 and 1995, the California Supreme Court disciplined 
thirty-six judges: fifteen removals, including one contested retirement; twenty censures; and one 
uncontested involuntary retirement.  Id.  Since authorized to impose sanctions, the Commission has 
disciplined 131 judges.  Id.  Between 1988 and 1995, the Commission’s authority to impose 
disciplinary measures was limited to public reprovals, which required the consent of the judge.  Id.  
Reports indicate that the commission made seventeen public reprovals during these six years.  Id.  
The 1995 amendments to the California Constitution shifted the authority to impose all disciplinary 
measures from the Supreme Court to the commission, including removal of a judge from the bench 
for unraveled misconduct.  Id.  The Supreme Court maintains only discretionary review of 
disciplinary actions.  Id.  The sanction of public reproval was replaced by the sanction of public 
admonishment.  Id.  Since 1995, the commission has made seventy-four public admonishments, 
twenty-nine public censures, and one private admonishment.  Id. 
 361. CAL. 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 335, at 2. 
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D.  A Transparent Process 
The commission’s process must strike a balance between the public’s right to 
know when a public official is being investigated and a concern for the 
prosecutor’s professional reputation.  A prosecutorial commission should adopt 
the compromise of most judicial commissions: the commission will refrain from 
public disclosure during the preliminary investigation stage.362  Because the 
overwhelming number of complaints against judges ultimately lack merit, there 
is no public benefit to disclosure at the beginning of the investigation. 363  
However, once a complaint survives initial scrutiny, the public should has the 
right to notice of all proceedings and sanctions imposed. 
E.  Recognizing and Preserving Prosecutorial Independence 
Prosecutor commissions, like judicial commissions, raise important concerns 
about interference with prosecutorial autonomy, which is critical to both 
prosecutors’ and judges’ abilities to perform their duties successfully.  The 
experts on the commission, who will understand and value prosecutorial 
independence, will work to preserve autonomy and, if necessary, serve as a 
check on the lay commissioners, who may not fully appreciate its importance. 
F.  Investigative and Adjudicatory Procedures that Ensure Due Process 
The structure and procedure the prosecutorial conduct commissions must 
ensure due process.  The prosecutor under investigation must receive timely 
notice of the complaint.  He must be afforded counsel at his request.  The 
adjudicatory process must be before a competent and impartial body, and should 
there be a finding of misconduct a wholly separate body must mete out any 
sanctions. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Establishing prosecutorial conduct commissions will receive scant support 
from legislatures reluctant to fight against the tide of public opinion, which 
views any efforts on behalf of convicted defendants as anti-law enforcement and 
pro-criminal.  Yet, the wave of public awareness of wrongful convictions 
resulting from overzealous prosecutions should provide some shelter for those 
lawmakers with the courage and conviction to press for meaningful reform.  
Reining in prosecutorial misconduct should be viewed as a core societal concern.  
Our criminal justice system is at its fairest when all those who come within its 
sphere receive the full measure of their constitutional protection. 
  
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. 
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